Showing posts with label moral damages. Show all posts
Showing posts with label moral damages. Show all posts

Sunday, August 14, 2011

“I DO OR I SUE” (Breach of Promise to Marry)

By Obiter07

You may have seen this just recently on the news with the headline “Malaysian groom sues runaway bride”.    A Malaysian man has filed suit against his fiancee “for £219,000 after she left him six hours before their wedding.”  He and his family “were distressed and embarrassed” when the bride “called off their June wedding at the last minute.”   The groom had invited 1,200 guests and was “seeking compensation for damages and defamation” from the bride and her father.

Just in case it happens to you, way back in 1964, the Philippine Supreme Court decided a similar case in Wassmer vs. Velez, G.R. No. L-20089, December 26, 1964. But in this case it was the bride and not the groom who was left behind. As aptly observed by the High Court the “facts that culminated in this case started with dreams and hopes, followed by appropriate planning and serious endeavors, but terminated in frustration and, what is worse, complete public humiliation.”  In appropriate dramatic fashion, the wedding was set for September 4 when the groom left this note for the bride-to-be:

“Dear ___
Will have to postpone wedding — My mother opposes it. Am leaving on the Convair today.
Please do not ask too many people about the reason why — That would only create a scandal.
P_____

A telegram followed reassuring her that nothing had changed and that he would be back soon.  He was not heard from again   The bride sued for damages and was awarded “with P2,000.00 as actual damages; P25,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages; P2,500.00 as attorney's fees; and the costs.”  The defendant had been declared in defaut when he failed to file an answer.

Later, defendant filed a petition to be relieved from the judgment. The court set the case for possible settlement but ultimately, the defendant’s counsel manifested that “chances of settling the case amicably were nil.”  The court denied the petition.  Defendant appealed to the Supreme Court.  The Court dismissed the appeal on the ground that a “petition for relief from judgment on grounds of fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence, must be duly supported by an affidavit of merits stating facts constituting a valid defense. (Sec. 3, Rule 38, Rules of Court.)  The defendant's affidavit that he has a good defense due to fortuitous events which stated “mere conclusions or opinions instead of facts” was not valid.

Defendant had contended that “the judgment is contrary to law” as "there is no provision of the Civil Code authorizing" an action for breach of promise to marry.” The Court agreed but stated that “the extent to which acts not contrary to law may be perpetrated with impunity, is not limitless for Article 21 of said Code provides that "any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage." [underscoring supplied]

The Court adverted to the application for the license to contract marriage, how the wedding date was set, invitations printed and sent out, the trousseau and party dresses prepared and even the matrimonial bed with accessories having been purchased. Then after sending his note and subsequent telegram, defendant disappeared.  It found that “Surely this is not a case of mere breach of promise to marry. As stated, mere breach of promise to marry is not an actionable wrong. But to formally set a wedding and go through all the above-described preparation and publicity, only to walk out of it when the matrimony is about to be solemnized, is quite different. This is palpably and unjustifiably contrary to good customs for which defendant must be held answerable in damages in accordance with Article 21 aforesaid.”

This Court affirmed the judgment but modified the award of moral and exemplary damages to P15,000.00.

As the case and the news article shows, hell hath no fury like a man or woman scorned. And, under certain circumstances, if you fail to say “I do,” the other party can say “I sue.”


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Sunday, April 10, 2011

BAGMEN: Liability for Lost Luggage

By Obiter07

In Air France vs. Gillego, G.R. No 165266, December 15, 2010, the Supreme Court discussed the liability that airlines have for lost luggage, particularly in terms of moral damages due to a passenger.  Unfortunately for the airline, this was no ordinary passenger but a Congressman on his way to deliver a speech.

In 1993, Congressman Gillego was the keynote speaker at the 89th Inter-Parliamentary Conference Symposium on “Parliament: Guardian of Human Rights”.  The Congressman left for Paris and was to take a connecting flight to Budapest.  He learned of an earlier flight to Budapest and made arrangements for the same.  He was given a ticket and a boarding pass for this new flight as well as a new baggage claim stub for his checked-in luggage. 

Upon arrival at Budapest, his luggage was not at the claims section.  He sought assistance and was advised to wait at the hotel. His luggage was never delivered despite inquiries.   

Upon his return home, his lawyer wrote Air France complaining about the loss and the damages he suffered while in Budapest arising from his loss of personal effects, medicines and even the speeches he had prepared, among others.  He only had his travel documents, pocket money and the clothes on his back.  He was constrained to shop for personal items including clothes and medicines which amounted to $1,000. He even had to make another speech which was made more difficult due to the lack of data and information that was in his luggage. He asked for P1,000,000.00 from the petitioner as compensation. Air France ignored his repeated follow-ups on his lost luggage. He thereafter filed a complaint for damages against Air France.

The trial court awarded P1,000,000.00 as moral damages; P500,000.00 as exemplary damages and P50,000.00 as attorney’s fees to the plaintiff.   This was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.

Air France sought relief before the Supreme Court, arguing that the award of “extravagant sums to respondent that already tend to punish the petitioner and enrich the respondent, which is not the function at all of moral damages” and that “the damages awarded are definitely not proportionate or commensurate to the wrong or injury supposedly inflicted.” The plaintiff was after all an expert in the field of human rights who could have delivered his speech even without his notes. 

The petition was found to be partly meritorious.  The Supreme Court held that being a “business intended to serve the travelling public primarily, a contract of carriage is imbued with public interest.”  “Article 1735 of the Civil Code provides that in case of lost or damaged goods, common carriers are presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently, unless they prove that they observed extraordinary diligence as required by Article 1733.  Thus, in an action based on a breach of contract of carriage, the aggrieved party does not have to prove that the common carrier was at fault or was negligent. All that he has to prove is the existence of the contract and the fact of its non-performance by the carrier.” [emphasis supplied]

There is no dispute that the checked-in luggage was not found upon arrival at plaintiff’s destination and was only returned two years later. The action is founded on the breach of the contract of carriage with Air France unable to offer any satisfactory explanation for the unreasonable delay in the delivery of the baggage. Since the presumption of negligence was not overcome, liability for the delay was established.  Upon recovery of the baggage during trial, the plaintiff no longer pressed his claim for actual or compensatory damages.

For moral damages to be awarded in the breach of contract of carriage, “the breach must be wanton and deliberately injurious or the one responsible acted fraudulently or with malice or bad faith.  Not every case of mental anguish, fright or serious anxiety calls for the award of moral damages.”  Where there is no showing of fraud or bad faith, “liability for damages is limited to the natural and probable consequences of the breach of the obligation which the parties had foreseen or could have reasonably foreseen. In such a case the liability does not include moral and exemplary damages.”
 
Air France was found liable for moral damages. Petitioner’s station manager testified that upon receiving the letter-complaint, she immediately began working on the Property Irregularity Report (PIR). This is issued at the airline station upon complaint by a passenger on missing baggage.  From the computer-printout, a PIR was initiated at the Budapest counter.  A search telex was sent out on three subsequent dates.  Based on the PIR printout, the plaintiff only gave his Philippine address and telephone number, and not the address and contact number of his Budapest hotel. The PIR usually is printed in two originals, one for the station manager and the other copy is for the passenger.  There was no record or entry in the PIR of any follow-up call made by the plaintiff in Budapest.  Plaintiff claimed that he was not given a copy of this PIR and that his repeated telephone calls were ignored.

It was found that Air France “acted in bad faith in repeatedly ignoring respondent’s follow-up calls.” The alleged entries in the PIR were not to be considered since these were not authenticated by the airline station representative in Budapest.  The Court did not accept as justification that plaintiff should be faulted in allegedly not giving his hotel address and phone number.  It found unbelievable that the plaintiff would not give his hotel and other information after he had promptly filed a complaint.  And even assuming that only the Philippine details were given, this does not explain why Air France never communicated with plaintiff concerning the lost baggage long after he had returned to the Philippines.  The missing luggage was returned only after the trial.

In addition, the PIR only establishes that telex searches were made but there is no attempt to explain the loss of the luggage.  Air France “did not give the attention and care due to its passenger whose baggage was not transported and delivered to him at his travel destination and scheduled time.  Inattention to and lack of care for the interest of its passengers who are entitled to its utmost consideration, particularly as to their convenience, amount to bad faith which entitles the passenger to an award of moral damages.”  Bad faith may be “in securing the contract and in the execution thereof, as well as in the enforcement of its terms, or any other kind of deceit.”  [emphasis supplied]

The failure to cite any act of discourtesy or rudeness does not make plaintiff’s “loss and moral suffering insignificant and less deserving of compensation.” “In repeatedly ignoring respondent’s inquiries, petitioner’s employees exhibited an indifferent attitude without due regard for the inconvenience and anxiety he experienced after realizing that his luggage was missing.  Petitioner was thus guilty of bad faith in breaching its contract of carriage with the respondent, which entitles the latter to the award of moral damages.” [emphasis supplied]

However, the sum of P1,000,000.00  is “excessive and not proportionate to the loss or suffering inflicted on the passenger under the circumstances.”  The Court cited Trans World Airlines v. Court of Appeals where it considered the social standing of the aggrieved passenger who was a lawyer and director of several companies but nonetheless reduced the award of moral damages.

Moral damages are awarded “to enable the injured party to obtain means, diversion or amusement that will serve to alleviate the moral suffering he has undergone by reason of defendant's culpable action.” Exemplary damages are to “deter serious wrongdoings.” Under Article 2216 of the Civil Code, the assessment of damages is left to the discretion of the court according to the circumstances of each case. This is “limited by the principle that the amount awarded should not be palpably excessive as to indicate that it was the result of prejudice or corruption on the part of the trial court.  Simply put, the amount of damages must be fair, reasonable and proportionate to the injury suffered.”

Since Air France “failed to act timely on the passenger’s predicament caused by its employees’ mistake and more than ordinary inadvertence or inattention, and the passenger failed to show any act of arrogance, discourtesy or rudeness committed by the air carrier’s employees, the amounts of P200,000.00, P50,000.00 and P30,000.00 as moral damages, exemplary damages and attorney’s fees  would be sufficient and justified."

It is ironic that the award of damages, just like the luggage, comes too late since the plaintiff has already passed away.  Justice, just like baggage, can be just as delayed.

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Monday, April 4, 2011

CREDIT CAN’T WAIT (Awarding damages for an unreasonably long wait to get a credit card purchase approved/disapproved)

By Siesta-friendly

“[O]ne hour appears to be an awfully long, patently unreasonable length of time to approve or disapprove a credit card purchase” –  Supreme Court (Polo S. Pantaleon vs. American Express International, Inc, G.R. No. 174269, May 8, 2009)

In a nutshell, such was the reasoning behind the Supreme Court’s reinstatement of the Regional Trial Court’s decision awarding American Express credit cardholder Atty. Panteleon P500,000.00 as moral damages, P300,000.00 as exemplary damages, P100,000.00 as attorney’s fees, and P85,233.01 as expenses of litigation. Sweet.

Well, maybe not so, at the time of the incident complained about by said Amex card owner. 

The facts are best lifted verbatim from the decision. Don’t worry, the paragraphs may be long but they are an easy read -

“The petitioner, lawyer Polo Pantaleon, his wife Julialinda, daughter Anna Regina and son Adrian Roberto, joined an escorted tour of Western Europe organized by Trafalgar Tours of Europe, Ltd., in October of 1991.

xxx

[On] the last day of the tour, the group arrived at the Coster Diamond House in Amsterdam around 10 minutes before 9:00 a.m.  The group had agreed that the visit to Coster should end by 9:30 a.m. to allow enough time to take in a guided city tour of Amsterdam. The group was ushered into Coster shortly before 9:00 a.m., and listened to a lecture on the art of diamond polishing that lasted for around ten minutes. Afterwards, the group was led to the store’s showroom to allow them to select items for purchase. Mrs. Pantaleon had already planned to purchase even before the tour began a 2.5 karat diamond brilliant cut, and she found a diamond close enough in approximation that she decided to buy.  Mrs. Pantaleon also selected for purchase a pendant and a chain, all of which totaled U.S. $13,826.00.

To pay for these purchases, Pantaleon presented his American Express credit card together with his passport to the Coster sales clerk. This occurred at around 9:15 a.m., or 15 minutes before the tour group was slated to depart from the store. The sales clerk took the card’s imprint, and asked Pantaleon to sign the charge slip. The charge purchase was then referred electronically to respondent’s Amsterdam office at 9:20 a.m.

Ten minutes later, the store clerk informed Pantaleon that his AmexCard had not yet been approved. His son, who had already boarded the tour bus, soon returned to Coster and informed the other members of the Pantaleon family that the entire tour group was waiting for them. As it was already 9:40 a.m., and he was already worried about further inconveniencing the tour group, Pantaleon asked the store clerk to cancel the sale. The store manager though asked plaintiff to wait a few more minutes. After 15 minutes, the store manager informed Pantaleon that respondent had demanded bank references. Pantaleon supplied the names of his depositary banks, then instructed his daughter to return to the bus and apologize to the tour group for the delay.

At around 10:00 a.m, or around 45 minutes after Pantaleon had presented his AmexCard, and 30 minutes after the tour group was supposed to have left the store, Coster decided to release the items even without respondent’s approval of the purchase. The spouses Pantaleon returned to the bus. It is alleged that their offers of apology were met by their tourmates with stony silence. The tour group’s visible irritation was aggravated when the tour guide announced that the city tour of Amsterdam was to be canceled due to lack of remaining time, as they had to catch a 3:00 p.m. ferry at Calais, Belgium to London. Mrs. Pantaleon ended up weeping, while her husband had to take a tranquilizer to calm his nerves.

It later emerged that Pantaleon’s purchase was first transmitted for approval to respondent’s Amsterdam office at 9:20 a.m., Amsterdam time, then referred to respondent’s Manila office at 9:33 a.m, then finally approved at 10:19 a.m., Amsterdam time. The Approval Code was transmitted to respondent’s Amsterdam office at 10:38 a.m., several minutes after petitioner had already left Coster, and 78 minutes from the time the purchases were electronically transmitted by the jewelry store to respondent’s Amsterdam office. 

After the star-crossed tour had ended, the Pantaleon family proceeded to the United States before returning to Manila on 12 November 1992. While in the United States, Pantaleon continued to use his AmEx card, several times without hassle or delay, but with two other incidents similar to the Amsterdam brouhaha. On 30 October 1991, Pantaleon purchased golf equipment amounting to US $1,475.00 using his AmEx card, but he cancelled his credit card purchase and borrowed money instead from a friend, after more than 30 minutes had transpired without the purchase having been approved. On 3 November 1991, Pantaleon used the card to purchase children’s shoes worth $87.00 at a store in Boston, and it took 20 minutes before this transaction was approved by respondent.

[A]fter coming back to Manila, Pantaleon sent a letter through counsel to the respondent, demanding an apology for the “inconvenience, humiliation and embarrassment he and his family thereby suffered” for respondent’s refusal to provide credit authorization for the aforementioned purchases. In response, respondent sent a letter dated 24 March 1992, stating among others that the delay in authorizing the purchase from Coster was attributable to the circumstance that the charged purchase of US $13,826.00 “was out of the usual charge purchase pattern established.”  Since respondent refused to accede to Pantaleon’s demand for an apology, the aggrieved cardholder instituted an action for damages with the [RTC]. Pantaleon prayed that he be awarded P2,000,000.00, as moral damages; P500,000.00, as exemplary damages; P100,000.00, as attorney’s fees; and P50,000.00 as  litigation expenses.”

So, was the approximately 1 hour delay by Amex in approving or disapproving its cardholder’s purchase a breach of its obligation to the latter?

We already know what the RTC held. On appeal by Amex to the CA, the latter found no breach on Amex’s part and decided against Atty. Pantaleon.

The CA’s decision was based on the traditional role of creditor-debtor between credit card companies and credit cardholders, respectively. Citing the principle of mora accipiendi (which is delay on the part of the creditor to accept the performance of the obligation), the CA held that Amex, as creditor, may be held liable if it refuses performance of its obligation without just cause.

The CA found that Amex’s “delay was not attended by bad faith, malice, or gross negligence" and that Amex “had exercised diligent efforts to effect the approval” of the purchase because the purchases were “not in accordance with the charge pattern” of Atty. Pantaleon since at the Coster Diamond House, he was “making his very first single charge purchase of US$13,826,” and “the record of [his] past spending with [Amex] at the time [did] not favorably support his ability to pay for such purchase.”

The SC, however, held that Atty. Pantaleon was instead correct in citing the principle of mora solvendi (delay on the part of the debtor to fulfill his obligation), not mora accipiendi.  The traditional role of a credit card company as creditor applies when the cardholder has already incurred a debt.  In this case, the debt had not yet been created; the purchase was still pending approval or disapproval by Amex.  Thus, under mora solvendi, Amex is not creditor but debtor “insofar as it has the obligation to the customer … to act promptly on its purchases on credit.”

So, was Amex guilty of delay?

The SC found culpable delay on the part of Amex citing the findings of the RTC where both parties admitted that “normal approval time for purchases was a matter of seconds”. 

The SC admits:

“there really is no strict, legally determinative point of demarcation on how long must it take for a credit card company to approve or disapprove a customer’s purchase, much less one specifically contracted upon by the parties. Yet this is one of those instances when “you’d know it when you’d see it,” and one hour appears to be an awfully long, patently unreasonable length of time to approve or disapprove a credit card purchase. It is long enough time for the customer to walk.” to a bank a kilometer away, withdraw money over the counter, and return to the store.

Ok, now that delay was established, are the P500,000 moral damages awarded correct?  The original prayer was for P5,000,000.

The SC further admits that –

“defendant has the right, if not the obligation, to verify whether the credit it is extending upon on a particular purchase was indeed contracted by the cardholder, and that the cardholder is within his means to make such transaction. The culpable failure of respondent herein is not the failure to timely approve petitioner’s purchase, but the more elemental failure to timely act on the same, whether favorably or unfavorably. Even assuming that respondent’s credit authorizers did not have sufficient basis on hand to make a judgment, we see no reason why respondent could not have promptly informed petitioner the reason for the delay, and duly advised him that resolving the same could take some time. In that way, petitioner would have had informed basis on whether or not to pursue the transaction at Coster, given the attending circumstances. Instead, petitioner was left uncomfortably dangling in the chilly autumn winds in a foreign land and soon forced to confront the wrath of foreign folk.”

The SC found the RTC’s findings below sufficient in establishing that Amex acted fraudulently or in bad faith justifying the award for moral damages –

“While it is true that the Cardmembership Agreement, which [Amex] prepared, is silent as to the amount of time it should take defendant to grant authorization for a charge purchase, defendant acknowledged that the normal time for approval should only be three to four seconds. Specially so with cards used abroad which requires “special handling”, meaning with priority. Otherwise, the object of credit or charge cards would be lost; it would be so inconvenient to use that buyers and consumers would be better off carrying bundles of currency or traveller’s checks, which can be delivered and accepted quickly. Such right was not accorded to plaintiff in the instances complained off for reasons known only to defendant at that time. This, to the Court’s mind, amounts to a wanton and deliberate refusal to comply with its contractual obligations, or at least abuse of its rights, under the contract.

x   x   x

The delay committed by defendant was clearly attended by unjustified neglect and bad faith, since it alleges to have consumed more than one hour to simply go over plaintiff’s past credit history with defendant, his payment record and his credit and bank references, when all such data are already stored and readily available from its computer. This Court also takes note of the fact that there is nothing in plaintiff’s billing history that would warrant the imprudent suspension of action by defendant in processing the purchase…

xxx

[Amex Manila’s credit authorizer] further testified that there were no “delinquencies” in plaintiff’s account.”

Thus, the SC found that culpable delay existed pursuant to Art. 1170 of the Civil Code which reads:

“Those who in the performance of their obligations are guilty of fraud, negligence, or delay, and those who in any manner contravene the tenor thereof, are liable for damages.”

And that such delay caused Atty. Pantaleon injuries enumerated in Art. 2217 of the Civil Code, namely, “moral shock, mental anguish, serious anxiety, wounded feelings and social humiliation” which gave rise to Amex’s liability for moral damages. 

What’s the moral of the story? Credit card companies, don’t let lawyers your customers wait for an unreasonably long time to approve or disapprove their credit card purchases. And saying sorry, as originally demanded, could avoid expensive litigation.

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