Where’s the Truth Commission on Human Rights Abuses?

By Siesta-friendly

From Argentina to the U.S., truth commissions have been established to reveal human rights violations and violators.  The Philippines is up there in world rankings relating to human rights abuses.  We rank 3rd - after Iraq and Somalia – in the CPJ’s (Committee to Protect Journalists) 2010 Global Impunity Index (of countries “where journalists are slain and killers go free”).[1]

In 2009, the ICRC (International Committee of the Red Cross) included the Philippines in its report on 8 of “the most troubled places in the world … which are either experiencing situations of armed conflict or armed violence or suffering their aftermath”.[2]  We are in the list together with Afghanistan, Colombia, Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Georgia, Haiti, Lebanon and Liberia.

In 2007, the UN was already so concerned that they sent Special Rapporteur, Philip Alston, “prompted by reports of a large number of extrajudicial killings, especially of leftist activists and journalists, over the past six years or so.”[3] 

Also in 2007, the International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH), sent a fact-finding mission because of [“i]ncreasing allegations that the Filipino government’s fight against terrorism causes specific human rights violations … The preliminary conclusions of the mission are very worrying: it appears that torture, enforced disappearances and extrajudicial killings are common practice in the Philippines …”[4] 

Local human rights group Karapatan (Alliance for the Advancement of People’s Rights) reports that from 2001-2009 (the Gloria Arroyo regime) there have been 1,188 extrajudicial killings, 208 enforced disappearances, 1,963 illegal arrests (excluding mass arrests) and 288 political prisoners.[5]

Yet despite our notorious human rights record and culture of impunity, the new Aquino government chooses instead to set up a truth commission to uncover corruption. To be fair, our culture of corruption deserves serious focus as well.  But it is telling of our government’s priorities when President Aquino’s 1^st State of the Nation Address (last July) enumerated allegations of corruption and no hint of human rights abuses, and his first Executive Order is the establishment of the Truth Commission on corruption with hardly any pronouncement, to date, on the government’s efforts regarding extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances.

Why are human rights abuses not a top priority?

The need to investigate human rights abuses

On July 12, 2010, a hopeful Human Rights Watch (HRW) wrote President Aquino its hopes, concerns and recommendations.[6]  Its first recommendation?  To investigate police and military personnel implicated in killings -

Human Rights Watch has found that police investigators in alleged extrajudicial killing cases often adopt a posture of irresponsible passivity, doing nothing themselves to investigate these crimes and placing the onus entirely on victims' families, many of whom have no idea who murdered their loved one. Police investigators routinely ignore anonymous leads, despite the fear of retaliation that compels witnesses to resort to anonymity.

Instead, investigators have told Human Rights Watch that they will not launch an investigation until someone is brave enough to risk his or her life by delivering a signed statement. Even when victims have allegedly been abducted by security forces, the police typically conduct only a perfunctory search. The Arroyo government made much of the human rights training that is given to the police but the lessons learned in the classroom are quickly unlearned when police officers see that no one is held accountable for such lackluster investigations of human rights abuses.

In your first 60 days in office, you should:

·         Order the Criminal Investigation and Detection Group (CIDG) and the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) to investigate police and military personal, particularly at the command level, who have been implicated in killings and enforced disappearances.

·         Issue an executive order directing police and NBI investigators to vigorously pursue crimes allegedly committed by government officials and police officers or themselves be subject to disciplinary measures for insubordination or a criminal investigation for obstruction of justice or graft and corruption.

·         Publicly order the chief of the Philippine National Police to open hotlines or comparable lines of communication to receive anonymous information on extrajudicial killings and other human rights abuses.

To round up the HRW’s 6 recommendations, here are the remaining 5: 1) Take immediate steps to protect the witnesses to human rights abuses and their families; 2) Pass a law to criminalize and prevent enforced disappearances; 3) Abolish militia forces; 4) Institute tougher controls on local government procurement of weapons; 5) Dismantle "death squads" and investigate government involvement.[7] 

Of course, the HRW is hardly alone.  The UN Special Rapporteur and the FIDH fact-mission recommended effective investigations as well, among other things.   In its report on The State of Human Rights in the Philippines in 2009, the Asian Human Rights Commission (AHRC) discussed “[t]he failure to investigate hundreds of political killings attributable to the State” as a topic of concern.[8] Below is a brief summary of their findings.

Government actions

Task Force Usig

In the AHRC report are listed the Arroyo government’s attempts to address extrajudicial killings.  (Unfortunately, only extrajudicial killings have largely been focused on, if at all. There has been no special agency to handle illegal detention or enforced disappearance cases.) 

As reported by the AHRC, Task Force Usig was created in 2006 under the Philippine National Police “to resolve at least 'ten cases of alleged extra-judicial killings within ten weeks'. Over three years later, there is no evidence to suggest that the task force has been able to meet the target.”  The report also notes that “[e]ven if the task force had been able to meet its target of resolving one case a week, in mid-2006 there were already some 700 allegations of political killings and this would have taken the task force 14 years to complete the job.”[9]

Task Force 211

It seemed that Task Force Usig was deemed insufficient because shortly after its creation or in 2007, Task Force 211 under the DOJ (Department of Justice) was created.  As of February 2010, Task Force 211 has only handled 265 cases of extrajudicial killings (versus 1,188 reported by Karapatan), more than half of which are either already archived, cold or dismissed[10] -

CASE CLASSIFICATION	TOTAL
I. Archived/ Accused at Large	70
II. Cold Cases	50
III. Dismissed   Cases	65
IV. On Trial	35
V. Under Police Investigation	13
VI. Under Preliminary Investigation	14
VII. Terminated (Trial on the Merits)	18
TOTAL	265

Special Courts

Also in 2007, the Supreme Court (SC) issued Administrative Order No. 25-2007 (a copy of which we could not find so we are relying on Court of Appeals Associate Justice Lucas P. Bersamin’s “Available Judicial Remedies In Cases Of Extrajudicial Killings And Enforced Disappearances”)[11] for the SC AO’s contents.  The SC designated “about 100 Regional Trial Courts throughout the country as special courts to hear, try and decide cases involving killings of political activists and members of the media.  Such cases are given priority in the trial calendars of the special courts and shall undergo continuous trial (to be terminated within 60 days from the commencement of the hearing) and determined within 30 days from the time the cases are submitted for decision, unless a shorter period is provided by the law or otherwise directed by the Supreme Court. To expedite the proceedings, no postponement or continuance shall be allowed except for clearly meritorious cases.”[12]

AHRC’s report notes that SC has guidelines to the special courts "to include the status of the extra-judicial cases in their monthly report of cases." “Despite the SC's guidelines, however, there are no known monthly status reports available. It is not known whether any sanctions were imposed on judges and court staff as a result.”[13]

To put a long story short, not only do these government efforts fall short of substantially addressing human rights abuses but their existence only emphasize the failure of government avenues normally used for the redress of such abuses.

We need the whole truth and nothing but the truth on all forms of abuses before we can even think of starting afresh.  And so we go back to our initial question: Where’s the truth commission on human rights abuses?

 

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[1]  Getting away with murder. (2010, April 20). Retrieved from http://www.cpj.org/reports/2010/04/cpj-2010-impunity-index-getting-away-with-murder.php#index

[2]  Summary report: afghanistan, colombia, democratic republic of the congo, georgia, haiti, lebanon, liberia and the philippines. (2009, June). Retrieved from http://www.icrc.org/Web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/htmlall/views-from-field-report-240609/$File/Our%20World%20-%20Views%20From%20Countries%20-%20Summary%20Report%20Part1-BKMRK.pdf

[3]  Alston, P. (2007, March 27). U.N. General Assembly, Human Rights Council, Fourth Session Agenda Item 2, Implementation of general assembly resolution 60/251 of 15 march 2006 entitled “human rights council”. Preliminary note on the visit of the special rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, philip alston, to the philippines (12-21 february 2007), (A/HRC/4/20/ADD.3). Retrieved from http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G07/120/95/PDF/G0712095.pdf?OpenElement

[4]  International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH) and Philippine Alliance of Human Rights Advocates (PAHRA) Submission for the first session of the Universal Periodic Review 7-18 April 2008 Republic of the Philippines. (2008, April 7-18). Retrieved from http://lib.ohchr.org/HRBodies/UPR/Documents/Session1/PH/FIDH_PHL_UPR_S1_2008_InternationalFederationforHumanRights_etal_uprsubmission.pdf

[5]  2009 year-end report on the human rights situation in the philippines. (2009, December 12). Retrieved from http://www.karapatan.org/2009-HR-Report

[6] Roth, K. (2010, July 12). Letter to president aquino regarding extrajudicial killings in the philippines. Retrieved from http://www.hrw.org/node/91567

[7]  Philippines: ending killings should top aquino’s agenda. (2010, July 12). Retrieved from http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2010/07/12/philippines-ending-killings-should-top-aquino-s-agenda

[8]  The state of Human rights in the philippines in 2009. (2009). Retrieved from http://material.ahrchk.net/hrreport/2009/AHRC-SPR-007-2009-Philippines-HRReport2009.pdf

[9]  Ibid, p.8.

[10]  Total number of cases. (2010, February 23). Retrieved from http://www.taskforce211.com.ph/bk_sub/bk_sub/ejk/ejk_total_sub.html

[11]  Bersamin, L. (n.d.). Available judicial remedies in cases of extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances. Retrieved from http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/publications/summit/Summit%20Papers/Bersamin%20-%20Extrajudicial%20Killings%20Summit.pdf

[12]  Ibid, p.3

[13]   The state of Human rights in the philippines in 2009, supra; p.10.

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COMMANDING OR MONITORING? (Which of President Aquino’s statements is correct on his exact role during the hostage crisis?)

By Siesta-friendly

We find some contradictory statements by President Aquino, in the aftermath of the Quirino Grandstand hostage crisis, quite disturbing as they show to us 1) a possible amount of lying to the public and even to another head of government no less, 2) a degree of deflecting government liability despite complete video coverage of the entire hostage situation and the government’s visible inadequate responses, and 3) an over-all lack of integrity on a nation’s leader.

There are many reasons to resent President Aquino’s decisions in relation to the hostage crisis: a) the lack of noticeable sadness and seriousness (with frequent smiling while at times seemingly arrogant or casual with arms folded across his chest) shortly after the deaths of innocent lives as seen during his press conference a few hours after the crisis – the conference seemed more akin to an informal discussion than a sad moment of reflection immediately following the loss of 8 innocent lives; b) a lack of concern for the hostages having failed to ever visit them the few days they remained in the country while being able to inspect the crime scene the day after the crisis (while not forgetting to carry over the smiles he had during the previous night’s presscon); c) the refusal to direct even a hint of blame for the deaths on the government’s decision to be patient with the hostage-taker despite several opportunities to disable him; d) frequent finger-pointing at the media as major contributor to the deaths.  We could go on and on.

But we take issue now on the president’s statements regarding his exact role during the crisis.

In his first press conference a few hours after the hostage crisis, President Aquino replied to the question why it took him so long “to come out and face the nation” as follows:

“… the ground commander has to be given confidence. He is the person who is there at the site, who will have to make the snap decisions if necessary and it does not help him to have somebody looking over his shoulder and micro-managing everything that he has to do.

So consciously, from the morning since we were informed of this incident, we were asking to be kept apprised of the developments, but consciously, it had to [unintelligible]. We delegated the authority to the rightful persons who are tasked to carry out the functions of the state given the situations.”[1] [emphasis supplied]

In the same presscon, when asked if he had plans to call Hong Kong Chief Executive Donald Tsang, Aquino mentioned:

“… mula kaninang umaga hinihingi kong ma-update sa lahat ng developments.  Ngayong gabi po, siniusubukan kong maunawaan yung kabuoan nung ng nangyari …” [since this morning, I had asked to be updated of all developments.  Tonight, I am trying to understand the entirety of what happened][2]

Nowhere in the above statements is there any indication that Aquino did more than inquire about what was going on.  And definitely, no indication that he was engrossed in commanding or even supervising the government’s actions to what were unfolding at the Quirino Grandstand.  Aquino’s statements above jibe with his Presidential Communications Secretary Ricky Carandang’s statements that Aquino was [just] monitoring the hostage situation and was [only] being updated of the events.[3] 

Both Aquino and Carandang’s statements are in harmony with the subsequent senate investigation last week which found that Manila Mayor Alfredo Lim was head of the local crisis committee and thus the civilian in-charge of the hostage situation.[4]

YET, in explaining to Mr. Tsang why he was unable to return the latter’s call (the South China Morning Post reports Tsang’s office made 2 calls, the 1^st at 4 p.m. and the 2^nd at 8 p.m.), Aquino says, in the words of Donald Tsang:

After his telephone conversation with the president on Tuesday, Tsang said in a video posted on the internet: "The first thing he told me was that he was sorry for not having called me back [on Monday] because he was then busy commanding the operation."[5] [emphasis supplied]

Another version of possibly the same video address states Donald Tsang’s words as follows:

“President Aquino rang me up and he apologized for the event. He felt particularly sorrowful for what had happened and he also apologized that he could not return my call because he was totally engaged in supervising the operation," he said in a video address on Friday. [emphasis supplied]

That Aquino deemed himself too busy to call or even return the call of a head of government at a time of national importance to the latter and his people is distressing.  It shows disrespect and disregard. 

But how then do we assess the apparent contradictory statements of the president: his assertions that imply he did no more than be updated of the developments relating to the hostage situation against his claims that he was too busy to even return the calls of another head of government worried about the latter’s fellow citizens? 

It doesn’t end there - Aquino has been reported to have said he did not know Tsang called.[6]

So, Aquino tells Tsang he was too busy to return his call at the same time admitting that he did not know Tsang called. Which is which?

All these statements cannot be taken lightly especially because of their national significance as to his role during the hostage crisis as well as the international implication as to the truth of his unavailability to be reached by Hong Kong’s head of government and the over-all significance of the suspicion of untruthfulness on the part of our nation’s leader.

It’s barely 2 months after his inauguration and President Aquino has already failed a leadership test.  Would he also fail a lie detector test?

Dare to be true. Nothing can need a lie:

a fault which needs it most, grows two thereby.

George Herbert

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[1]  (1/3) manila hostage crisis - 1st live press conference noynoy aquino (full coverage) 08-24-2010 . (2010). [Web]. Retrieved from http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YZZNPASyFn0

[2]  (2/3) manila hostage crisis - 1st live press conference noynoy aquino (full coverage) 08-24-2010 . (2010). [Web]. Retrieved from http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=f69nmKxJW1g&feature=related

[3]  Adriatico , F. (2010, August 25). Retr ieved from http://www.pbs.gov.ph/new/site/?section=news&category=national&article_id=69

[4]  Mendez, C. (2010, August 27). 'Lim headed hostage crisis committee' . Retrieved from http://www.philstar.com/Article.aspx?articleId=606521&publicationSubCategoryId=63

[5]  Robles , R, & Fung, F. (2010, August 26). Tsang's phone calls stopped with aquino's aides. Retrieved from http://www.scmp.com/portal/site/SCMP/menuitem.2af62ecb329d3d7733492d9253a0a0a0/?vgnextoid=30c9ade342aaa210VgnVCM100000360a0a0aRCRD&ss=Hong+Kong&s=News

[6]  Tordesillas, E. (2010, August 25). Aquino calls up donald tsang. Retrieved from http://verafiles.org/main/focus/making-up-to-hongkong/

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READING BETWEEN THE LINES (How to read President Aquino’s statement in the aftermath of the tragic Manila hostage crisis)

By Siesta-friendly

We’ve seen the entire hostage crisis of August 35, 2010 play out on our tv screens and are now bothered with tons of questions.  President Aquino’s statement a few hours after the hostage crisis is telling of the government authorities’ disastrous mindset that led to the tragedy.  The official statement recounts the hostage-taker’s temperament and the government’s actions during the crisis. Nowhere is there an indication that they were alarmed that innocent people were being held hostage by a fully armed ex-police officer.  Their focus was more on the hostage-taker (Rolando Mendoza) not the rescue of the hostages.  And nowhere is there any mention of possible lapses in judgment on the part of the government or the police.  But the subject and wording of the statement reveals such lapses in judgment.   It really seemed to be all about Mr. Mendoza and what he wanted or was happening to him, not about the hostages’ safety and rescue.

Below is President Aquino’s official statement[1] in verbatim followed every now and then by our interpretation of his words in bold italics –

With the rest of the Filipino people, I wish to offer our deepest condolences to the families of the victims whose lives were lost in the hostage situation at the Quirino Grandstand because we failed to regard their safety over and above the hostage-taker’s demands.  I have nothing to say to the other hostages who did not die and only suffered injuries and lifelong trauma.  The Secretary of Foreign Affairs has conveyed our deep feelings of sorrow to the Foreign Minister of the People’s Republic of China and the people of Hong Kong through Hong Kong Chief Executive Donald Tsang since they have been unable to contact me nor did I want to call them up and apprise them of what was happening from the time the crisis occurred.  I have tasked Secretaries Soliman and Lim to provide everything necessary for the recovery and return home of the survivors (because we clearly cannot provide for any one’s safety in this country) as well as to take care of those who tragically died tonight (which is the least we could do considering we failed miserably to protect them while they were still alive).. I have directed the fullest cooperation with the Hong Kong authorities and the People’s Republic of China authorities who are on their way to the Philippines because they understandably don’t trust us.

From the onset of this incident, the hostage-taker seemed to be non-belligerent, as shown by the release of hostages. As to the hostages’ conditions, we had no idea until they were killed or injured.  As you know, the rules of hostage-taking say that as long as the hostage-taker is non-belligerent, he is harmless and shouldn’t be disabled, even if there are several opportunities to do so.  These were encouraging signs. And we were not discouraged at all that he continued to hold hostage innocent men, women and children while he was himself heavily armed. 

We were going to wait him out.  And let the hostages suffer for as long as necessary especially since we didn’t even know what they were going through anyway. The idea was to let the ground commanders who are the experts in this field handle the operation with minimal interference from people who are less expert.  And since they are experts, they can’t be wrong. So when the ground commanders gave minimal interference to media personnel, the latter who are not experts are to blame for whatever went wrong.

But the situation deteriorated rapidly when, during the course of the negotiations, he was given the letter of the Ombudsman in which she promised to personally review his case even though he demanded that his case be decided on immediately thus making the letter meaningless to him.  As he was reading the contents of the letter, while talking to an unknown individual on the cellphone, he became increasingly agitated.  But he still seemed to be non-belligerent. So we didn’t do anything.

The presence of his brother also added to the tension.  Media coverage of the presence of his brother added more tension.  But the fact that the presence of his brother was allowed in the first place is no one’s fault.

At this point, he threatened to kill a hostage. The police decided to remove the brother from the scene. And as the negotiators were departing, the negotiators were shot at.  Still, no assault was made because he seemed to be non-belligerent.

Media coverage of his brother being taken into custody might have further agitated the hostage-taker.  Although media coverage was left unhampered by the ground commanders who are the experts in this field, its still the media personnel’s fault .

Shots were fired. They seemed to be warning shots, as there was no audible indication of tumult or chaos to show that the hostages were in immediate danger.  That the bus was big and airconditioned and the hostages were probably scared and played dead may have been why there was no audible indication of tumult or chaos, but that’s not the point. And because we weren’t monitoring the media, we failed to be informed that he told a radio station that he had already shot 2 of his hostages and that the shots and screams of hostages were heard over the radio.

Nonetheless even though the circumstances called for an assault, the negotiators tried to establish contact with the hostage-taker but they were unsuccessful as the cellphone of the hostage-taker was continuously busy and we didn’t want to assault him without talking to him first and he also refused to answer the throw-phone provided for him by the authorities (we forgot he was still busy on the other line).

The escape of the driver, combined with his reports that the hostages were being harmed - I am conveniently forgetting that his exact words were that they were all dead - and because we didn’t disable him when we could, forced the assault to happen.  But the police force’s fear of bodily harm to themselves forced the assault to happen in 90 minutes of slow motion.  While the police force’s fear of bodily harm to any one forced the assault to happen with the use of 1 sledgehammer no one could handle and a few bullets which may or may not have hit a hostage or two. When the vehicle began to move, and with reports that he had hand grenades, a decision was made to immobilize the vehicle as it would have made the situation even more dangerous by exposing more of the populace to the danger since our police force cannot assault a parked bus what more a moving one?

As we know, the incident tragically ended in the deaths of eight innocent civilians whom we always assumed he would not hurt because he seemed to be non-belligerent.

We expect more of the facts to come to light when my government and police force begin to accept the truth of our incompetence and I have ordered Justice Secretary Leila de Lima and Secretary Jesse Robredo to thoroughly lead this review because no one trusts the Philippine National Police to do it. 

In the end, we are not at fault for according the utmost patience to one of our own especially because he seemed to be non-belligerent even though he took a busload of people at gunpoint (with an M16 no less) and eventually shot at his 15 hostages and killed 8 of them including 1 child.  He caused this to himself, with the help of his family members and the media.  If a similar hostage situation were to happen again tomorrow, we would act the same way since we have not found fault in our actions except in maybe allowing full media coverage.

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[1]   (1/3) noynoy aquino 1st live press conference on hostage crisis (full) 08-24-2010 . (2010, August 26). Retrieved from http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YZZNPASyFn0

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STRATEGY OF ERRORS: Why the August 23, 2010 hostage-taking is NOT reminiscent of Jun Ducat but of Dexter Balala’s (Or how not to handle a hostage situation)

By Siesta-friendly

4-year old Dexter Balala was grabbed and taken hostage at knife point by Diomedes Talbo while Dexter and his parents were waiting at a bus terminal for their connecting bus ride home. After about 2 hours of negotiations inside the bus depot and in full and sniper-friendly view of 21 police officers including 4 high-ranking police officers of the local police force, Talbo started stabbing Dexter.  Only after a few seconds did the police start shooting.  And when it rained, it poured - on both the hostage taker and his hostage.  Talbo died immediately of gunshot wounds but young Dexter suffered both Talbo’s 13 knife stabs and 5 bullet wounds.  Both a knife wound and bullet wound in the chest proved fatal to Dexter.  Dexter died due to obvious police hesitation and general incompetence. All 341 officers and men of the Pasig police station then under Supt. Eduardo de la Cerna were relieved and ordered to undergo retraining and re-orientation.  That was in June 2002.

8 years later and the police, sadly, have not changed much.  On August 23, 2010, the same police slowness and indecision against a hostage taker (one of their own – Senior Inspector Rolando Mendoza) cost the lives of 7 hostages including a 13-year old girl, all Chinese nationals. The hostage situation lasted more than 10 hours with several hostages being released in batches during the day. How a 14-year old girl (who eventually died) was not among the children negotiated to be initially released is one of several fatal tactical lapses.  How terrified the child must have been during those 10 hours of patience the authorities gave to Mr. Mendoza to bring terror to his hostages. 

The other lapses? Let’s see:

• allowing video coverage of behind-the-scene activities especially the arrest of the hostage-taker’s family members which seemed to have agitated the hostage taker and prompted him to start shooting the hostages;
• allowing real-time media coverage of the hostage situation possibly providing the hostage taker information on police movements;
• not effectively cordoning off the scene causing a civilian to be hit by a stray bullet and allowing onlookers to crowd the scene and hamper rescue and relief efforts once the hostage-taker was down;
• shooting or even just disabling the hostage taker when he was in PLAIN view, guns undrawn and no one in harm’s way (several photos below show how cameramen were able to shoot the hostage taker while snipers couldn’t. Does S.W.A.T. stand for Sorry We Aren’t Trained?);

Mendoza arm raised in full view.  Credit: independent.ie http://www.independent.ie/breaking-news/world-news/seven-dead-after-manila-bus-siege-2308042.html?start=2

 

 

 

Mendoza in full view.  Credit:  Peace Fm Online http://foreign.peacefmonline.com/news/201008/73760.php

Mendoza waving in full view.  Credit: gulfnews.com http://gulfnews.com/news/world/philippines/philippine-police-arrest-brother-of-hostage-taker-1.672110

Mendoza half body view by window near the door.  Credit: Yahoo! News http://news.yahoo.com/nphotos/Former-policeman-hijacks-bus-Manila/ss/events/wl/082210philippinesbus/im:/100823/ids_photos_wl/r2800825690.jpg/

Mendoza with 1 negotiator, guns undrawn, hostages out of harm's way.  Credit: Yahoo! News http://news.yahoo.com/nphotos/Former-policeman-hijacks-bus-Manila/ss/events/wl/082210philippinesbus#photoViewer=/100823/481/urn_publicid_ap_org796b8cb5170e481eb5f54d211674a024

 

Mendoza with 2 negotiators, guns undrawn, hostages out of harm's way.  Credit: World Correspondents http://www.worldcorrespondents.com/philippine-bus-hostage-drama-comes-to-bloody-conclusion/889185

Mendoza guns undrawn by the door with a hostage.  Credit: Khaleej Times Online http://www.khaleejtimes.com/DisplayArticle09.asp?xfile=data/international/2010/August/international_August1210.xml&section=international

Mendoza in full view watching hostage leave.  Credit:  The Voice of Russia http://english.ruvr.ru/2010/08/23/16942328.html

• (once they had information the hostage taker had shot and killed hostages) taking up about 90 minutes to “begin the assault” of 1 bus with 1 hostage-taker.  
• in an assault, using police officers afraid of getting harmed.  Contrast the situation with the French assault of Air France Flight 8969 which was hijacked by terrorists on December 24, 1994.   The French forces boarded and maneuvered airstairs to reach the doors.  They approached the plane from the front and rear simultaneously.  They opened the doors from the outside.  The French were fired upon, grenades exploded but they didn’t stop.  In the distance, snipers also fired upon the 4 hostage-takers.  After a 20-minute gunbattle, all 169 passengers and crew and were alive.  Although 10 of them were wounded, all of the French forces were alive while the 4 hostages were killed. (you can watch a short video of the assault here  
•  using only 1 tool (the sledgehammer) - and one they could not handle - which ended up inside the bus at least 2 times (it would have been comical if no lives were at risk and subsequently lost);
• using only the sledgehammer – one excruciatingly slow movement at a time – to break the bus doors or windows;
• apparently not inquiring from the bus driver or tour operator how to open the bus’ emergency exit;
• assaulting the bus only (and illogically) one side at a time – first the side window, then the door then the front window then the rear window then the door again;
• tying a rope (and not a cable) to the bus door and pulling it with a pick-up truck at an angle where the rope will break and the door will not open which is exactly what happened;
• using tear gasses without gas masks thus further delaying their entry into the bus;
• not using night vision goggles in order to locate the hostage taker inside the dark bus;
• over-all consideration for the hostage-taker’s demands over the hostages’ safety (by not taking the several and clear opportunities to disable him)
• if meeting his demands were paramount, then why go halfway and not give in to them fully in order to arrest him once he is reinstated;
• the astoundingly apparent lack of a plan B in case negotiations broke down.

Experts will likely point out far more lapses. Already, Frederic Gallois, “who once commanded France's elite hostage rescue unit”, has expressed his sentiments, telling the AFP news agency that the police operation was "badly prepared and risky" and that the police involved "visibly lacked adequate equipment and tactical competence".[1] Idiots, in diplomatic language.

Operational Procedures During Hostage Situations[2]

 

The police’s rules of engagement seem severely lacking in detailed operational tactics when it comes to hostage crises.  Even then, one can easily cross out the police’s recent lapses (in both the negotiations and the assault) just by reading the applicable rules below –

Rule 26. HOSTAGE SITUATION/BARRICADED SITUATIONS

SECTION 1. Procedure to be followed in a Hostage Situation.  The following steps shall be undertaken:

a.       A Crisis Management Task Group shall be activated immediately.

b.      Incident scene shall be secured and isolated.

c.       Unauthorized persons shall not be allowed entry and exit to the incident scene.

d.      Witnesses’ names, addresses, and other information shall be recorded.  Witnesses shall be directed to a safe location.

SECTION 2. Ground Commander.  There shall be only one Ground Commander in the area. Until such time that he officially designates a spokesperson, he may issue appropriate press statements and continue to perform the role of the spokesperson.

SECTION 3. Negotiators.  Negotiators shall be designated by the Ground Commander.  No one shall be allowed to talk to the hostage-taker without clearance from the negotiator or Ground Commander.

SECTION 4. Assault Team.   An assault team shall be alerted for deployment in case the negotiation fails.  Members of the assault team shall wear authorized and easily recognizable uniform during the conduct of the operation.

SECTION 5. Assault Plan.  The  assault  shall  be  planned  to  ensure  minimal  threat  to  life  for  all parties.

SECTION 6.  Support Personnel.  An ambulance with medical crew and a fire truck shall be detailed at the incident area.

SECTION 7. Coordination.  Proper coordination with all participating elements shall be done to consolidate efforts in solving the crisis.

SECTION 8. Safety of Hostage(s).  In negotiating for the release of a hostage, the safety of the hostage shall always be paramount.

SECTION 9.  Guidelines during Negotiations.  Situation must be stabilized first and contained before the start of the negotiation;

a.       Do not introduce outsiders (non-law enforcement officers) into the negotiation process, unless their presence is extremely necessary in the solution of the crisis.  If so introduced, they shall be properly advised on the do’s and don’ts of hostage negotiations; and

b.      Police officers without proper training shall not be allowed to participate in hostage negotiations.”[3]

The above rules, in light of what happened on August 23, 2010, seem hopelessly lacking in operational and procedural details. 

President Aquino’s official statement after the hostage crisis blaming everyone else except the police is chilling to all of us who fear that police incompetence will continue as always.  It is perverse that the involvement of foreigners could actually work as an advantage to us - well aware of the frequent incompetence of our police force - as our government gives more importance to foreigners (and their investment/tourism money) than their own people.

To date, the President and the police have expressed shocked and dismay that the negotiations broke down and the hostage-taker became violent.  Blaming the breaking down of negotiations rather than their patience with a hostage-taker is immaturity at its worst.  They blame the hostage-taker’s family, even the media personnel, but themselves for the turn of events.  If they treated Senior Inspector Rolando Mendoza as a criminal and not one of their own, Mendoza might have been taken down sooner and with no loss but his own life perhaps.  If the government had not thought Mendoza deserving of all leeway possible (despite clear opportunities to take him down), if they had even considered that he was capable of violence from his actions of taking innocent people hostage fully-armed, the world might be praising us now for quick and decisive actions against a hostage-taker. 

The continued defensiveness of our authorities bodes ill for our hopes than our police force could finally change this time around.

Thus far, we have seen police torturing a suspect, read about them involved in  indiscriminate shootings during operations, how they  allegedly killed  a suspect while in custody through a blow to the neck,  how they do arrests without a warrant in full view of media and still try to justify it, how a member of their own took hostage a bus full of innocents and on how they seem to lack even the basic tactical sense for emergency situations. These are not the kind of men we want to trust with guns and with the responsibility to protect us.  Lessons have to be learned and not one more innocent life should be lost. Too often they have gone out to kill and maim and not to serve and protect.

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[1]  Philippines president pledges manila bus siege inquiry. (2010, August 23). Retrieved from http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-pacific-11066656

[2]  Philippine national police operational procedures. (2010, March). Retrieved from http://www.pnppro10.org/downloads/POP.pdf

[3]  Supra.

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TORTURE: A Dead End

By Obiter07

We really have all the laws we need.  It is enforcement we lack.  As well as respect for laws especially (and terrifyingly) if one is a law enforcer.  Abuse of power and authority have prevailed through the ages.

Way back in 1917, Act No 2711 of the Administrative Code already prohibited torture by the police:

“SECTION 2685.       Maltreatment and abuse of authority. — Any member of the Constabulary who whips, maltreats, abuses, subjects to physical violence, or tortures by the so-called "water cure" or otherwise, any native of the (Philippine Islands) Philippines or other person, or who causes such whipping, maltreatment, abuse, or torture of any native of the (Philippine Islands) Philippines or other person for the purpose of extorting from him any confession or inducing him to give any information whatsoever, shall be punished by imprisonment at hard labor for a term not exceeding five years or by a fine not exceeding ten thousand pesos, or both. Final conviction of any such offense shall by and of itself constitute a dismissal of the offender from the Constabulary service and shall make him ineligible to any position of trust or confidence in the Government of the (Philippine Islands) Philippines.”

It appears that we have not progressed except now we have graphic evidence of such misdeeds.  Only recently, a video came to light showing an alleged policeman  apparently  torturing a suspect.[1] 

Even the Constitution has not served to deter the commission of this despicable offense.  It clearly states:

“SECTION 12.           (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.

(2)   No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiate the free will shall be used against him. Secret detention places, solitary, incommunicado, or other similar forms of detention are prohibited.

(3)   Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section 17 hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence against him.

(4)   The law shall provide for penal and civil sanctions for violations of this section as well as compensation to and rehabilitation of victims of torture or similar practices, and their families. [Article III]” (Emphasis supplied]

And to give teeth to the foregoing, we have REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9745 which is AN ACT PENALIZING TORTURE AND OTHER CRUEL, INHUMAN AND DEGRADING TREATMENT OR PUNISHMENT AND PRESCRIBING PENALTIES THEREFOR” which became law last year.

           

This was passed pursuant to the state’s policy to respect human rights, including suspects, such that no person in custody shall be “subjected to physical, psychological or mental harm, force, violence, threat or intimidation or any act that impairs his/her free will or in any manner demeans or degrades human dignity,” to do away with secret detention places and to adhere to our international obligations  against torture (Section 1).

The Act outlaws torture which is “an act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him/her or a third person information or a confession; punishing him/her for an act he/she or a third person has committed or is suspected of having committed; or intimidating or coercing him/her or a third person; or for any reason based on discrimination of any kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a person in authority or agent of a person in authority. It does not include pain or suffering arising only from, inherent in or incidental to lawful sanctions (Section 3).”   

           

The enumeration makes one wonder who was able to come up with the list.  And at the rate we are going, it even gives rise to an unfounded fear that some people may be using it as a reference just in case they missed something.   The list goes:

“SECTION 4. Acts of Torture. — For purposes of this Act, torture shall include, but not be limited to, the following:

(a)    Physical torture is a form of treatment or punishment inflicted by a person in authority or agent of a person in authority upon another in his/her custody that causes severe pain, exhaustion, disability or dysfunction of one or more parts of the body, such as:   

1)      Systematic beating, headbanging, punching, kicking, striking with truncheon or rifle butt or other similar objects, and jumping on the stomach;

2)      Food deprivation or forcible feeding with spoiled food, animal or human excreta and other stuff or substances not normally eaten;

3)      Electric shock;

4)      Cigarette burning; burning by electrically heated rods, hot oil, acid; by the rubbing of pepper or other chemical substances on mucous membranes, or acids or spices directly on the wound(s);

5)      The submersion of the head in water or water polluted with excrement, urine, vomit and/or blood until the brink of suffocation;

6)      Being tied or forced to assume fixed and stressful bodily position;

7)      Rape and sexual abuse, including the insertion of foreign objects into the sex organ or rectum, or electrical torture of the genitals;   

8)      Mutilation or amputation of the essential parts of the body such as the genitalia, ear, tongue, etc.;

9)      Dental torture or the forced extraction of the teeth;

10)  Pulling out of fingernails;

11)  Harmful exposure to the elements such as sunlight and extreme cold;

12)  The use of plastic bag and other materials placed over the head to the point of asphyxiation;

13)  The use of psychoactive drugs to change the perception, memory, alertness or will of a person, such as:

                                                        i)    The administration of drugs to induce confession and/or reduce mental competency; or   

                                                      ii)    The use of drugs to induce extreme pain or certain symptoms of a disease; and

14)  Other analogous acts of physical torture; and

(b)   "Mental/Psychological Torture" refers to acts committed by a person in authority or agent of a person in authority which are calculated to affect or confuse the mind and/or undermine a person's dignity and morale, such as:   

1)      Blindfolding;

2)      Threatening a person(s) or his/her relative(s) with bodily harm, execution or other wrongful acts;

3)      Confinement in solitary cells or secret detention places;

4)      Prolonged interrogation;

5)      Preparing a prisoner for a "show trial", public display or public humiliation of a detainee or prisoner;

6)      Causing unscheduled transfer of a person deprived of liberty from one place to another, creating the belief that he/she shall be summarily executed;   

7)      Maltreating a member/s of a person's family;

8)      Causing the torture sessions to be witnessed by the person's family, relatives or any third party;

9)      Denial of sleep/rest;

10)  Shame infliction such as stripping the person naked, parading him/her in public places, shaving the victim's head or putting marks on his/her body against his/her will;

11)  Deliberately prohibiting the victim to communicate with any member of his/her family; and

12)  Other analogous acts of mental/psychological torture.

The fact that we could enumerate such acts even with the laudable objective of  preventing them shows the dark side of humanity.   But the Act does not stop with torture and includes "Other cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment" or “deliberate and aggravated treatment or punishment not enumerated under Section 4 above," inflicted by a person in authority or agent of a person in authority against a person under his/her custody, which attains a level of severity causing suffering, gross humiliation or debasement to the latter. (Section 3 in relation to Section 5)

Secret detention places, solitary confinement or other forms of detention where torture can be carried out are likewise prohibited (Section 7).  This does not cover a hypothetical situation.   In SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE, et al. vs. MANALO, et al. [G.R. No. 180906.  October 7, 2008.],  the Supreme Court affirmed the issuance by the Court of Appeals of a writ amparo based on accounts relating to torture and murder at the hands of the military.

           

Freedom from torture and inhuman punishment is declared as an absolute right and invocations of war, emergency or instability cannot justify its use (Section 6). No evidence obtained using torture is admissible except against a person accused of committing torture (Section 8). And a victim is entitled to an investigation by the proper government agencies, to protection against harassment and threats and in order to give testimony (Section 9).

Typically, it is difficult to prove allegations of torture unless this has been attested to a medical practitioner.  Under Section 12, before and after interrogation, “every person arrested, detained or under custodial investigation shall have the right to be informed of his/her right to demand physical examination by an independent and competent doctor of his/her own choice. If such person cannot afford the services of his/her own doctor, he/she shall be provided by the State with a competent and independent doctor to conduct physical examination. The State shall endeavor to provide the victim with psychological evaluation if available under the circumstances. If the person arrested is a female, she shall be attended to preferably by a female doctor. Furthermore, any person arrested, detained or under custodial investigation, including his/her immediate family, shall have the right to immediate access to proper and adequate medical treatment.”  This serves to expand what rights are usually read to a suspect upon an arrest.

That actual perpetrator, those who cooperate and even superiors and commanding officers can be held liable. And this includes an officer who should have known about such acts by reason of his position:

“SECTION 13.           Who are Criminally Liable. — Any person who actually participated or induced another in the commission of torture or other cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment or who cooperated in the execution of the act of torture or other cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment by previous or simultaneous acts shall be liable as principal.

Any superior military, police or law enforcement officer or senior government official who issued an order to any lower ranking personnel to commit torture for whatever purpose shall be held equally liable as principals.

The immediate commanding officer of the unit concerned of the AFP or the immediate senior public official of the PNP and other law enforcement agencies shall be held liable as a principal to the crime of torture or other cruel or inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment for any act or omission, or negligence committed by him/her that shall have led, assisted, abetted or allowed, whether directly or indirectly, the commission thereof by his/her subordinates. If he/she has knowledge of or, owing to the circumstances at the time, should have known that acts of torture or other cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment shall be committed, is being committed, or has been committed by his/her subordinates or by others within his/her area of responsibility and, despite such knowledge, did not take preventive or corrective action either before, during or immediately after its commission, when he/she has the authority to prevent or investigate allegations of torture or other cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment but failed to prevent or investigate allegations of such act, whether deliberately or due to negligence shall also be liable as principals.”   

This includes accessories who profit from or conceal the crime as well as those who harbor the principals:

“Any public officer or employee shall be liable as an accessory if he/she has knowledge that torture or other cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment is being committed and without having participated therein, either as principal or accomplice, takes part subsequent to its commission in any of the following manner:

a)      By themselves profiting from or assisting the offender to profit from the effects of the act of torture or other cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment;

b)      By concealing the act of torture or other cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment and/or destroying the effects or instruments thereof in order to prevent its discovery; or

c)      By harboring, concealing or assisting in the escape of the principals in the act of torture or other cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment: Provided, That the accessory acts are done with the abuse of the official's public functions.(Section 13)

The penalties range from reclusion perpetua, prision correcional to arresto mayor (Section 14).  Torture is to be treated as a separate and independent crime and shall not be absorbed by any felony committed as a consequence (Section 15).

When will these abuses stop?  We get to ask who will guard the guardians when they torture and sometimes even kill.  And we can only turn for hope to the courts, minding its words in one case:

“This court is not blind to the suffering of the victim's family arising from his untimely death, but we are bound to uphold the constitutional rights of the accused. Let this be a stern lesson to the police authorities and to the prosecution to perform their sworn tasks with utmost regard to the mandates of the Constitution. Criminals cannot be apprehended, prosecuted and punished under the law by resorting to non-legal means. PEOPLE vs. PULGA, et al [G.R. No. 138045.  March 14, 2001.]”

We cannot allow torture to continue to be the means for an end, no matter how laudable the latter may seem. It appears that we are all seeking shortcuts, looking for coerced confessions instead of gathering evidence and inflicting punishment even before trial or a conviction. There is no end that justifies the use of such means.  And we become less human each time we get to allow or tolerate such acts.

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[1] CHR launches probe on police torture video, Agence France-Presse, First Posted 12:35:00 08/18/2010, http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/breakingnews/nation/view/20100818-287498/CHR-launches-probe-on-police-torture-video

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