4-year old Dexter Balala was grabbed and taken hostage at knife point by Diomedes Talbo while Dexter and his parents were waiting at a bus terminal for their connecting bus ride home. After about 2 hours of negotiations inside the bus depot and in full and sniper-friendly view of 21 police officers including 4 high-ranking police officers of the local police force, Talbo started stabbing Dexter. Only after a few seconds did the police start shooting. And when it rained, it poured - on both the hostage taker and his hostage. Talbo died immediately of gunshot wounds but young Dexter suffered both Talbo’s 13 knife stabs and 5 bullet wounds. Both a knife wound and bullet wound in the chest proved fatal to Dexter. Dexter died due to obvious police hesitation and general incompetence. All 341 officers and men of the Pasig police station then under Supt. Eduardo de la Cerna were relieved and ordered to undergo retraining and re-orientation. That was in June 2002.
8 years later and the police, sadly, have not changed much. On August 23, 2010, the same police slowness and indecision against a hostage taker (one of their own – Senior Inspector Rolando Mendoza) cost the lives of 7 hostages including a 13-year old girl, all Chinese nationals. The hostage situation lasted more than 10 hours with several hostages being released in batches during the day. How a 14-year old girl (who eventually died) was not among the children negotiated to be initially released is one of several fatal tactical lapses. How terrified the child must have been during those 10 hours of patience the authorities gave to Mr. Mendoza to bring terror to his hostages.
The other lapses? Let’s see:
- allowing video coverage of behind-the-scene activities especially the arrest of the hostage-taker’s family members which seemed to have agitated the hostage taker and prompted him to start shooting the hostages;
- allowing real-time media coverage of the hostage situation possibly providing the hostage taker information on police movements;
- not effectively cordoning off the scene causing a civilian to be hit by a stray bullet and allowing onlookers to crowd the scene and hamper rescue and relief efforts once the hostage-taker was down;
- shooting or even just disabling the hostage taker when he was in PLAIN view, guns undrawn and no one in harm’s way (several photos below show how cameramen were able to shoot the hostage taker while snipers couldn’t. Does S.W.A.T. stand for Sorry We Aren’t Trained?);
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| Mendoza arm raised in full view. Credit: independent.ie http://www.independent.ie/breaking-news/world-news/seven-dead-after-manila-bus-siege-2308042.html?start=2 |
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| Mendoza in full view. Credit: Peace Fm Online http://foreign.peacefmonline.com/news/201008/73760.php |
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| Mendoza waving in full view. Credit: gulfnews.com http://gulfnews.com/news/world/philippines/philippine-police-arrest-brother-of-hostage-taker-1.672110 |
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| Mendoza half body view by window near the door. Credit: Yahoo! News http://news.yahoo.com/nphotos/Former-policeman-hijacks-bus-Manila/ss/events/wl/082210philippinesbus/im:/100823/ids_photos_wl/r2800825690.jpg/ |
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| Mendoza with 1 negotiator, guns undrawn, hostages out of harm's way. Credit: Yahoo! News http://news.yahoo.com/nphotos/Former-policeman-hijacks-bus-Manila/ss/events/wl/082210philippinesbus#photoViewer=/100823/481/urn_publicid_ap_org796b8cb5170e481eb5f54d211674a024 |
| Mendoza with 2 negotiators, guns undrawn, hostages out of harm's way. Credit: World Correspondents http://www.worldcorrespondents.com/philippine-bus-hostage-drama-comes-to-bloody-conclusion/889185 |
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| Mendoza guns undrawn by the door with a hostage. Credit: Khaleej Times Online http://www.khaleejtimes.com/DisplayArticle09.asp?xfile=data/international/2010/August/international_August1210.xml§ion=international |
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| Mendoza in full view watching hostage leave. Credit: The Voice of Russia http://english.ruvr.ru/2010/08/23/16942328.html |
- (once they had information the hostage taker had shot and killed hostages) taking up about 90 minutes to “begin the assault” of 1 bus with 1 hostage-taker.
- in an assault, using police officers afraid of getting harmed. Contrast the situation with the French assault of Air France Flight 8969 which was hijacked by terrorists on December 24, 1994. The French forces boarded and maneuvered airstairs to reach the doors. They approached the plane from the front and rear simultaneously. They opened the doors from the outside. The French were fired upon, grenades exploded but they didn’t stop. In the distance, snipers also fired upon the 4 hostage-takers. After a 20-minute gunbattle, all 169 passengers and crew and were alive. Although 10 of them were wounded, all of the French forces were alive while the 4 hostages were killed. (you can watch a short video of the assault here
- using only 1 tool (the sledgehammer) - and one they could not handle - which ended up inside the bus at least 2 times (it would have been comical if no lives were at risk and subsequently lost);
- using only the sledgehammer – one excruciatingly slow movement at a time – to break the bus doors or windows;
- apparently not inquiring from the bus driver or tour operator how to open the bus’ emergency exit;
- assaulting the bus only (and illogically) one side at a time – first the side window, then the door then the front window then the rear window then the door again;
- tying a rope (and not a cable) to the bus door and pulling it with a pick-up truck at an angle where the rope will break and the door will not open which is exactly what happened;
- using tear gasses without gas masks thus further delaying their entry into the bus;
- not using night vision goggles in order to locate the hostage taker inside the dark bus;
- over-all consideration for the hostage-taker’s demands over the hostages’ safety (by not taking the several and clear opportunities to disable him)
- if meeting his demands were paramount, then why go halfway and not give in to them fully in order to arrest him once he is reinstated;
- the astoundingly apparent lack of a plan B in case negotiations broke down.
Experts will likely point out far more lapses. Already, Frederic Gallois, “who once commanded France
The police’s rules of engagement seem severely lacking in detailed operational tactics when it comes to hostage crises. Even then, one can easily cross out the police’s recent lapses (in both the negotiations and the assault) just by reading the applicable rules below –
Rule 26. HOSTAGE SITUATION/BARRICADED SITUATIONS
SECTION 1. Procedure to be followed in a Hostage Situation. The following steps shall be undertaken:
a. A Crisis Management Task Group shall be activated immediately.
b. Incident scene shall be secured and isolated.
c. Unauthorized persons shall not be allowed entry and exit to the incident scene.
d. Witnesses’ names, addresses, and other information shall be recorded. Witnesses shall be directed to a safe location.
SECTION 2. Ground Commander. There shall be only one Ground Commander in the area. Until such time that he officially designates a spokesperson, he may issue appropriate press statements and continue to perform the role of the spokesperson.
SECTION 3. Negotiators. Negotiators shall be designated by the Ground Commander. No one shall be allowed to talk to the hostage-taker without clearance from the negotiator or Ground Commander.
SECTION 4. Assault Team. An assault team shall be alerted for deployment in case the negotiation fails. Members of the assault team shall wear authorized and easily recognizable uniform during the conduct of the operation.
SECTION 5. Assault Plan. The assault shall be planned to ensure minimal threat to life for all parties.
SECTION 6. Support Personnel. An ambulance with medical crew and a fire truck shall be detailed at the incident area.
SECTION 7. Coordination. Proper coordination with all participating elements shall be done to consolidate efforts in solving the crisis.
SECTION 8. Safety of Hostage(s). In negotiating for the release of a hostage, the safety of the hostage shall always be paramount.
SECTION 9. Guidelines during Negotiations. Situation must be stabilized first and contained before the start of the negotiation;
a. Do not introduce outsiders (non-law enforcement officers) into the negotiation process, unless their presence is extremely necessary in the solution of the crisis. If so introduced, they shall be properly advised on the do’s and don’ts of hostage negotiations; and
b. Police officers without proper training shall not be allowed to participate in hostage negotiations.”[3]
The above rules, in light of what happened on August 23, 2010, seem hopelessly lacking in operational and procedural details.
President Aquino’s official statement after the hostage crisis blaming everyone else except the police is chilling to all of us who fear that police incompetence will continue as always. It is perverse that the involvement of foreigners could actually work as an advantage to us - well aware of the frequent incompetence of our police force - as our government gives more importance to foreigners (and their investment/tourism money) than their own people.
To date, the President and the police have expressed shocked and dismay that the negotiations broke down and the hostage-taker became violent. Blaming the breaking down of negotiations rather than their patience with a hostage-taker is immaturity at its worst. They blame the hostage-taker’s family, even the media personnel, but themselves for the turn of events. If they treated Senior Inspector Rolando Mendoza as a criminal and not one of their own, Mendoza
The continued defensiveness of our authorities bodes ill for our hopes than our police force could finally change this time around.
Thus far, we have seen police torturing a suspect, read about them involved in indiscriminate shootings during operations, how they allegedly killed a suspect while in custody through a blow to the neck, how they do arrests without a warrant in full view of media and still try to justify it, how a member of their own took hostage a bus full of innocents and on how they seem to lack even the basic tactical sense for emergency situations. These are not the kind of men we want to trust with guns and with the responsibility to protect us. Lessons have to be learned and not one more innocent life should be lost. Too often they have gone out to kill and maim and not to serve and protect.
[1] Philippines
[2] Philippine national police operational procedures. (2010, March). Retrieved from http://www.pnppro10.org/downloads/POP.pdf
[3] Supra.
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