The issue in the case we want to tackle now is not whether or not something said was libel but whether or not the court had
jurisdiction over the libel committed.
In this case, the alleged libelous material was found in a blog.[1]
As regards jurisdiction in libel
cases, the relevant provision is found in the 2nd paragraph of Art.
360 of the Revised Penal Code (as amended by Republic Act 4363):
“The criminal and civil
action for damages in cases of written defamations … shall be filed
simultaneously or separately with the court of first instance of the province
or city where the libelous article is printed and first published or where
any of the offended parties actually resides at the time of the commission of
the offense: Provided,
however, … in case one of the offended parties is a private individual, the
action shall be filed in the Court of First Instance of the province or city
where he actually resides at the time of the commission of the offense or where
the libelous matter is printed and first published...” [underline supplied]
The complainant in this case, a Jessie
John P. Gimenez, filed, on behalf of the Yuchengco Family (former Ambassador
Alfonso Yuchengco and Helen Y. Dee of the Malayan Insurance Co., Inc.), a
criminal complaint before the Makati City Prosecutor’s Office, for 13 counts of
libel against the officers of Parents Enabling Parents Coalition, Inc. (PEPCI),
trustees of PEPCI, a member of PEPCI, and a certain John Doe, the administrator
of the website www.pepcoalition.com. Gimenez also alleged that PEPCI owned,
controlled and moderated on the internet a blog at www.pacificnoplan.blogspot.com
and a yahoo e-group at no2pep2010@yahoogroups.com,
sites easily accessible to the public or by anyone logged on to the internet.
Gimenez claimed that when he
accessed websites in Makati
on various dates he “was appalled to read numerous articles [numbering 13],
maliciously and recklessly caused to be published by [the accused] containing
highly derogatory statements and false accusations, relentlessly attacking the
Yuchengco Family, YGC, and particularly, Malayan.” For example:
“Talagang naisahan
na naman tayo ng mga Yuchengcos.
Nangyari na ang mga kinatatakutan kong pagbagsak ng negotiation because
it was done prematurely since we had not file any criminal aspect of our
case. What is worse is that Yuchengcos benefited much from the nego. x x x
. That is the fact na talagang hindi
dapat pagtiwalaan ang mga Yuchengcos.
LET’S MOVE TO THE
BATTLEFIELD. FILE THE CRIMINAL CASES IN
COURT, BSP AND AMLC AND WHEREVER.
Pumunta tayong muli sa senado, congreso, RCBC Plaza,
and other venues to air our grievances and call
for boycott ng YGC. Let us start
within ourselves. Alisin natin ang mga investments and deposits natin sa lahat ng YGC and
I mean lahat and again convince friends to do the same. Yung mga nanonood lang noon ay dapat makisali
na talaga ngayon specially those who joined only after knowing that there was a
negotiation for amicable settlements.
FOR SURE MAY TACTICS
PA SILANG NAKABASTA SA ATIN. LET US BE
READY FOR IT BECAUSE THEY HAD SUCCESSFULLY LULL US
AND THE NEXT TIME THEY WILL TRY TO KILL US NA. x x x”
The Makati City Prosecutor’s Office
filed a complaint for libel but on appeal to the Department of Justice, the
“Justice Secretary opined that the crime of “internet libel” was non-existent,
hence, the accused could not be charged with libel under Article 353 of the
RPC.” This prompted the accused to file a
Motion to Quash the Information “on the grounds that it failed to vest
jurisdiction on the Makati RTC; the acts complained of in the Information are
not punishable by law since internet libel is not covered by Article 353 of the
RPC; and the Information is fatally defective for failure to designate the
offense charged and the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the
offense of libel.”
Unfortunately for the accused, the
Court of Appeals found the complaint sufficient in form.
Fortunately for the accused, the
Supreme Court held the opposite and said that -
“… that the venue of
libel cases where the complainant is a private individual is limited to only either
of two places, namely: 1) where the complainant actually resides at the
time of the commission of the offense; or 2) where the alleged defamatory
article was printed and first published.
The Amended Information in the present case opted to lay the venue by
availing of the second. Thus, it stated
that the offending article “was first published and accessed by the
private complainant in Makati
City.” In other words, it
considered the phrase to be equivalent to the requisite allegation of printing
and first publication.
The insufficiency of
the allegations in the Amended Information to vest jurisdiction in Makati becomes pronounced
upon an examination of the rationale for the amendment to Article 360 by RA No.
4363. Chavez v. Court of Appeals [G.R.
No. 125813, February 6, 2007, 514 SCRA 279, 285-286] explained the nature of
these changes:
xxx
“Before article 360 was amended, the rule was that
a criminal action for libel may be instituted in any jurisdiction where the
libelous article was published or circulated, irrespective of where it was
written or printed (People v. Borja,
43 Phil. 618). Under that rule, the criminal action is transitory and the
injured party has a choice of venue.
Experience had shown that
under that old rule the offended party could harass the accused in a libel case
by laying the venue of the criminal action in a remote or distant place.
xxx
To forestall such
harassment, Republic Act No. 4363 was enacted. It lays down specific rules as
to the venue of the criminal action so as to prevent the offended party in
written defamation cases from inconveniencing the accused by means of
out-of-town libel suits, meaning complaints filed in remote municipal courts (Explanatory Note for the bill which became Republic
Act No. 4363, Congressional Record of May 20, 1965, pp. 424-5; Time, Inc. v. Reyes, L-28882, May 31,
1971, 39 SCRA 303, 311).”
Further, the Supreme Court noted
that the phrase “where the libelous article is printed and first published’ cannot be
applied to “defamatory material appearing on a website on
the internet as there would be no way of determining the situs of its printing and first publication.”
Before dismissing the case, the
Supreme Court found cause to again cite the Chavez
case and thereby instruct future complainants that –
“These limitations imposed on libel actions filed by private persons are
hardly onerous, especially as they still allow such persons to file the civil
or criminal complaint in their respective places of residence, in which
situation there is no need to embark on a quest to determine
with precision where the libelous matter was printed and first published.”
It’s weird that some people have
said we don’t have internet libel in the Philippines because the Supreme
Court has even instructed us (in this Yuchengco
case) where victims can file such a case.
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