Being a judicial officer can sometimes be life-threatening. Just ask Judge Luisito Cortez who ‘won’ the raffle of the multiple murder case – 57 innocent fatalities so far - against massacre ‘suspect’ and Datu Unsay mayor Andal Ampatuan Jr. For obvious reasons, said ‘winning’ judge filed a Motion to Inhibit himself from trying the case, citing security reasons (as well as a heavy workload).
The Ampatuans are scaring e-v-e-r-y-o-n-e. People are either hiding, running away or coming out in the open with what they know. Even their arms dealer has come out confessing his dealings with the Ampatuans when some of his supply surfaced from the Ampatuan cache. While a jailed assassin has just given an interview confessing to killing no less than 100 people for the Ampatuans.
Fear of the Ampatuans has spread from the
But while we await the result of the next case raffle, let’s look into the justifiable reasons a judicial officer may cite to disqualify himself/herself from a case he is otherwise qualified to judge.
Disqualification Of Judicial Officers
The applicable rule (cited below from the Revised Rules of Court) “contemplates two kinds of inhibitions – compulsory and voluntary. The first paragraph provides that compulsory disqualification conclusively presumes that the judge cannot actively or impartially sit on a case. The second paragraph, in turn, leaves to the judge’s discretion whether he should desist from sitting in a case for other just and valid reasons. A judge, however, does not enjoy [a] wide latitude in the exercise of his discretion to inhibit himself from hearing a case, as the inhibition must be for just and valid causes.”[1]
Rule 137.
Sec. 1. Disqualification of judges. - No judge or judicial officer shall sit in any case in which he, or his wife or child, is pecuniarily interested as heir, legatee, creditor or otherwise, or in which he is related to either party within the sixth degree of consanguinity or affinity, or to counsel within the fourth degree, computed according to the rules of the civil law, or in which he has been executor, administrator, guardian, trustee or counsel, or in which he has presided in any inferior court when his ruling or decision is the subject of review, without the written consent of all parties in interest, signed by them and entered upon the record.
A judge may, in the exercise of his sound discretion, disqualify himself from sitting in a case, for just or valid reasons other than those mentioned above.
Voluntary inhibition under Sec. 1 Rule 137 seems aimed to prevent bias or prejudice as explained in Pimentel v. Salonga[2] -
“A judge may not be legally prohibited from sitting in a litigation. But when suggestion is made of record that he might be induced to act in favor of one party or with bias or prejudice against a litigant arising out of circumstance reasonably capable of inciting such a state of mind, he should conduct a careful self-examination. He should exercise his discretion in a way that the people's faith in the courts of justice is not impaired. A salutary norm is that he reflect on the probability that a losing party might nurture at the back of his mind the thought that the judge had unmeritoriously tilted the scales of justice against him. That passion on the part of a judge may be generated because of serious charges of misconduct against him by a suitor or his counsel, is not altogether remote. He is a man, subject to the frailties of other men. He should, therefore, exercise great care and caution before making up his mind to act or withdraw from a suit where that party or counsel is involved. He could in good grace inhibit himself where that case could be heard by another judge and where no appreciable prejudice would be occasioned to others involved therein. On the result of his decisions to sit or not to sit may depend to a great extent the all-important confidence in the impartiality of the judiciary. If after reflection he should resolve to voluntarily desist from sitting in a case where his motives or fairness might be seriously impugned, his action is to be interpreted as giving meaning and substance to the second paragraph of Section 1, Rule 137. He serves the cause of the law who forestalls miscarriage of justice.”
Judge Cortez is voluntarily inhibiting himself on the basis of the 2nd paragraph of Section 1. But not to prevent any suspicion of bias or prejudice. It is for security reasons. And the massacre of his family does seem a just and valid reason for a judge to inhibit himself from a case involving an Ampatuan (or someone as sinister). But in the absence of actual death threats against him, his family or staff, it might have been premature for the good judge to inhibit himself from the multiple murder case.
However Judge Cortez cannot be said to be one who is easily scared. He is trying “another celebrated case—multiple murder against former Abra Gov. Vicente Valera for the killing of Rep. Luis Versamin and his bodyguard in 2006.” While handling said latter case, he has admitted to having received death threats.
Perhaps the Supreme Court will not punish Judge Cortez’s voluntary inhibition on the ground that he does have a heavy workload which already includes other security-threatening sensational cases.
Whatever happens, and despite the apparent reluctance of the remaining judges to try the Ampatuans, the Supreme Court will ensure that the people’s faith in the independence of our courts of justice is preserved. When innocents are massacred, the courts remain as the only place where they may get justice. Judges may fear for their lives but the people look to them to ensure that they can live theirs in peace. Let them be given the protection that they need, but the wheels of justice should still turn if we do not wish to surrender to murderers and their ilk whose currency is fear and intimidation.
[1] Alejo vs. The Honorable Judge Erlinda Pestaño-Buted, G.R. Nos. 154150-51, December 10, 2007, citing People vs. Kho, G.R. No. 139381, April 20, 2001, 357 SCRA 290.
[2] G.R. No. 27934, September 18, 1967, 21 SCRA 160.
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