In a recent ruling, the Supreme Court upheld the dismissal of a flight steward on the ground of obesity. YRASUEGUI vs PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC. ( G.R. No. 168081 October 17, 2008) an international flight steward was dismissed for “his failure to adhere to the weight standards of the airline company.” It sounds discriminatory but the Court found that it was not.
On various dates, Petitioner was at 209 pounds, 217 pounds and 212 pounds, well beyond “the ideal weight being 166 pounds, as mandated by the Cabin and Crew Administration Manual of PAL.” When found to be overweight, he was asked to go on leave in order to address this. He was unable to comply and in one instance, he even gained weight instead by 49 pounds beyond the limit. He was restricted to ground duty as a result. He made a written commitment to reduce his weight.
He remained overweight despite periods given to him in order to comply. He failed to report for weight checks and was “formally warned that a repeated refusal to report for weight check would be dealt with accordingly.”
In 1992, he was finally served a “Notice of Administrative Charge for violation of company standards on weight requirements” and given 10 days to answer. In his answer, he did not deny being overweight. He claimed that his violation had been condoned by PAL and that PAL had discriminated against him considering that there were “cabin crew members who are similarly situated.”
In 1993, “petitioner was formally informed by PAL that due to his inability to attain his ideal weight, “and considering the utmost leniency” extended to him “which spanned a period covering a total of almost five (5) years,” his services were considered terminated “effective immediately.” He filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against PAL. The Labor Arbiter ruled in his favor but this was overturned by the Court of Appeals. Hence, his recourse to the Supreme Court.
He argued that “(1) his dismissal does not fall under 282(e) of the Labor Code; (2) continuing adherence to the weight standards of the company is not a bona fide occupational qualification; and (3) he was discriminated against because other overweight employees were promoted instead of being disciplined.”
The Court found that obesity of petitioner is a ground for dismissal under Article 282(e) of the Labor Code. It found that the weight standards of PAL “constitute a continuing qualification of an employee in order to keep the job.” And “an employee may be dismissed the moment he is unable to comply with his ideal weight as prescribed by the weight standards.” Hence a dismissal of the employee falls under Article 282(e) [1] of the Labor Code. It did not give credence to Petitioner’s claim that obesity is a “physical abnormality and/or illness,” citing Nadura v. Benguet Consolidated, Inc. The Supreme Court did not find the case applicable as it was not decided under the Labor Code. Moreover, there was no issue of flight safety in the aforecited case. In Nadura the dismissal was due to illness in contrast to the instant case where petitioner was dismissed for his failure to meet the weight standards of his employer. Another issue in Nadura is whether or not the dismissed employee is entitled to separation pay and damages. Here, the issue is the propriety of the dismissal. Fifth, in Nadura, the employee was not accorded due process. Here, petitioner was accorded “utmost leniency”, having been given more than four (4) years to comply with the weight standards.
The Court found that the evidence “on record militates against petitioner’s claims that obesity is a disease.” He was able to reduce weight given the “proper attitude, determination, and self-discipline.” He even admitted during a hearing that he could bring down his weight. The Court opined that “his fluctuating weight indicates absence of willpower rather than an illness.”
The Court also did not give weight (no pun intended) to petitioner’s citation of Bonnie Cook v. State of Rhode Island, Department of Mental Health, Retardation and Hospitals, decided by the United States Court of Appeals (First Circuit). In that case, it was held that morbid obesity is a disability under the Act cited therein and that respondent discriminated against her “based on “perceived” disability.” Evidence was introduced to show morbid obesity is a physiological disorder.
The Supreme Court found that petitioner is not morbidly obese. In the Cook case, the plaintiff was 100 pounds overweight. Petitioner was only less than 50 pounds over his ideal weight at his heaviest. One is tempted to thus ask if the Court would have decided in his favor if he had weighed more.
The Court held that the obesity of petitioner, in the context of his work as flight attendant, “becomes an analogous cause under Article 282(e) of the Labor Code that justifies his dismissal from the service.” His obesity may not be intentional but it is “voluntary.” This element runs through all just causes under Article 282.
Petitioner likewise argued that there should be a statute constituting a “bona fide occupational qualification” (“BFOQ”) where an exception allows “an employer to engage in an otherwise unlawful form of prohibited discrimination if necessary to the normal operation of a business or enterprise.” Petitioner claims that since there was no such statute, there is no justification for his dismissal.
The court stated that there is no merit to the argument that BFOQ cannot be applied if it has no supporting statute. The weight standards of PAL are reasonable. PAL being a common carrier “is bound to observe extraordinary diligence for the safety of the passengers it transports.” The weight standards of PAL show its effort to comply with these exacting obligations. PAL “has committed itself to safely transport its passengers. In order to achieve this, it must necessarily rely on its employees, most particularly the cabin flight deck crew who are on board the aircraft.”
Flight safety was given primary importance by the court, stating that: It cannot be gainsaid that cabin attendants must maintain agility at all times in order to inspire passenger confidence on their ability to care for the passengers when something goes wrong. It is not farfetched to say that airline companies, just like all common carriers, thrive due to public confidence on their safety records. People, especially the riding public, expect no less than that airline companies transport their passengers to their respective destinations safely and soundly.”
Cabin crew do not only serve meals or attend to passengers’ whims. Their “most important activity” is “to care for the safety of passengers and the evacuation of the aircraft when an emergency occurs. Passenger safety goes to the core of the job of a cabin attendant. Truly, airlines need cabin attendants who have the necessary strength to open emergency doors, the agility to attend to passengers in cramped working conditions, and the stamina to withstand grueling flight schedules.” And the “body weight and size of a cabin attendant are important factors to consider in case of emergency. Aircrafts have constricted cabin space, and narrow aisles and exit doors.” Airline companies cannot be compelled to reconfigure the aircraft just for overweight cabin attendants.
He was also found to be in estoppel since the weight standards were made known to him prior to his employment. He never questioned the authority of PAL when he was asked to trim down his weight. The Court even lapsed into Latin and Filipino: “Bona fides exigit ut quod convenit fiat. Good faith demands that what is agreed upon shall be done. Kung ang tao ay tapat kanyang tutuparin ang napagkasunduan.”
His allegation that he was discriminated against was not given credence. Except for pointing out the names of the supposed overweight cabin attendants, he “failed to indicate their respective ideal weights; weights over their ideal weights; the periods they were allowed to fly despite their being overweight; the particular flights assigned to them; the discriminating treatment they got from PAL; and other relevant data that could have adequately established a case of discriminatory treatment by PAL.”
Nevertheless the Court granted him separation pay even if normally, a legally dismissed employee is not entitled to separation pay. But it may be awarded as an act “social justice,” or based on “equity”, if the dismissal is not for serious misconduct and does not reflect on the moral character of the employee. He was thus given separation pay equivalent to one-half (1/2) month’s pay for every year of service.
It is with some irony that the scales of justice did not tip in favor of the petitioner here. However, this did involve a special case, where the nature of an employee’s duties with respect to flight safety was given emphasis by the Court. Not every job would be the same and mere obesity should not be a ground for dismissal. But health issues should be enough to compel an employee to lose weight not out of fear for his job but for fear for his life.
[1] Article 282 provides: “Termination by employer. — An employer may terminate an employment for any of the following just causes:
(a) Serious misconduct or willful disobedience by the employee of the lawful orders of his employer or representative in connection with his work;
(b) Gross and habitual neglect by the employee of his duties;
(c) Fraud or willful breach by the employee of the trust reposed in him by his employer or
(d) Commission of a crime or offense by the employee against the person of his employer or any immediate member of his family or his duly authorized representative; and
(e) Other causes analogous to the foregoing.
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