Cat in the Act (Landmark conviction under the Animal Welfare Act)

By Siesta-friendly

There are 2 cats involved in this story. One is Tengteng, a month-old feline residing presumably within the UP campus and cared for by someone as evidenced by his leash and a few photos taken of him[1].  

 

And the other, Joseph Carlo Candare, a UP Physics student who tortured and killed Tengteng.  In the interest of fair exposure, below are pictures of Mr. Candare[2] –

The 2 fatefully met under gruesome details provided none other than by Mr. Candare himself in a blog entry aptly titled “I killed Schrödinger’s cat”.  The blog has been deleted but a snapshot of his blog entry reveals the relevant details below[3] –

That was in 2009.  PAWS (Philippine Animal Welfare Society) promptly filed a criminal complaint against Mr. Candare under the Animal Welfare Act (R.A. 8485, February 1998).

In a further show of remorselessness, Mr. Candare failed to show up at trial until a warrant of arrest was issued against him.

Anyway, below are the pertinent sections of RA 8485 pursuant to which Mr. Candare was charged -

Sec. 6. It shall be unlawful for any person to torture any animal, to neglect to provide adequate care, sustenance or shelter, or maltreat any animal or to subject any dog or horse to dogfights or horsefights, kill or cause or procure to be tortured or deprived of adequate care, sustenance or shelter, or maltreat or use the same in research or experiments not expressly authorized by the Committee on Animal Welfare.

 
The killing of any animal other than cattle pigs, goats, sheep, poultry, rabbits, carabaos, horses, deer and crocodiles is likewise hereby declared unlawful except in the following instances:

(1)   When it is done as part of the religious rituals of an established religion or sect or a ritual required by tribal or ethnic custom of indigenous cultural communities; however, leaders shall keep records in cooperation with the Committee on Animal Welfare;

(2)   When the pet animal is afflicted with an incurable communicable disease as determined and certified by a duly licensed veterinarian;

(3)   When the killing is deemed necessary to put an end to the misery suffered by the animal as determined and certified by a duly licensed veterinarian;

(4)   When it is done to prevent an imminent danger to the life or limb of a human being;

(5)   When done for the purpose of animal population control;

(6)   When the animal is killed after it has been used in authorized research or experiments; and

(7)   Any other ground analogous to the foregoing as determined and certified licensed veterinarian.

In all the above mentioned cases, including those of cattle, pigs, goats, sheep, poultry, rabbits, carabaos, horses, deer and crocodiles the killing of the animals shall be done through humane procedures at all times.

 
For this purpose, humane procedures shall mean the use of the most scientific methods available as may be determined and approved by the committee.

 
Only those procedures approved by the Committee shall be used in the killing of animals.

Sec. 8. Any person who violates any of the provisions of this Act shall, upon conviction by final judgment, be punished by imprisonment of not less than six (6) months nor more than two (2) years or a fine of not less than One thousand pesos (P1,000.00) nor more than Five thousand pesos (P5,000.00) or both at the discretion of the Court. If the violation is committed by a juridical person, the officer responsible therefor shall serve the imprisonment when imposed. If the violation is committed by an alien, he or she shall be immediately deported after service of sentence without any further proceedings.

Its now 2011 and, finally, there’s a conviction against an animal torturer not engaged in the trade of animals or animal meat.  Mr. Candare is just a college student, albeit with what appears to be psychopathic tendencies.

In lieu of imprisonment, Mr. Candare was ordered to pay a P1,000 fine and to do 6 months of community service for PAWS.  Pretty light it seems considering his self-confessed serial killing, the gruesomeness of his work and his lack of empathy. 

Mr. Candare got all of Tengteng’s nine lives while he has the chance to start a new one for himself.  We look forward to the psychiatric help he is reported to be getting as a result of his crime.  Studies have long been made on the link of animal cruelty and full-blown psychopathy.  No one wants another landmark case, this time of a serial killer of a more advanced animal.  

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[1]  Photos courtesy of http://www.thepetitionsite.com/102/Justice-for-Tengteng/

[2]  Photos courtesy of http://www.thepetitionsite.com/102/Justice-for-Tengteng/

[3]  Snapshot courtesy of http://www.vincegolangco.com/wp-content/uploads/2009/04/cat-serial-killer.jpg

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FOR YOUR EYES ONLY: Anti- Photo and Video Voyeurism

By Obiter07

No longer can voyeurs and peeping toms with a penchant for recording what they see claim that no law prohibits their activities.  Republic Act No. 9995 is “AN ACT DEFINING AND PENALIZING THE CRIME OF PHOTO AND VIDEO VOYEURISM, PRESCRIBING PENALTIES THEREFOR, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES” (July 2009).   With the prevalence of cellphone and other small cameras, Congress has seen fit to punish those who violate the privacy of others through these means.

The Prohibited Acts are as follows:

“(a) To take photo or video coverage of a person or group of persons performing sexual act or any similar activity or to capture an image of the private area of a person/s such as the naked or undergarment clad genitals, public[1] (sic) area, buttocks or female breast without the consent of the person/s involved and under circumstances in which the person/s has/have a reasonable expectation of privacy;

(b) To copy or reproduce, or to cause to be copied or reproduced, such photo or video or recording of sexual act or any similar activity with or without consideration;

(c) To sell or distribute, or cause to be sold or distributed, such photo or video or recording of sexual act, whether it be the original copy or reproduction thereof; or

(d) To publish or broadcast, or cause to be published or broadcast, whether in print or broadcast media, or show or exhibit the photo or video coverage or recordings of such sexual act or any similar activity through VCD/DVD, internet, cellular phones and other similar means or device.

The prohibition under paragraphs (b), (c) and (d) shall apply notwithstanding that consent to record or take photo or video coverage of the same was given by such person/s. Any person who violates this provision shall be liable for photo or video voyeurism as defined herein. (Section 4)” [Emphasis supplied]

The act of taking video or photo coverage of sexual acts and of private parts without consent has been made a crime.  So is copying, selling, distributing, publishing or broadcasting the same.  And this is still punishable even if the ostensible victim has consented to the coverage:

(d) "Photo or video voyeurism" means the act of taking photo or video coverage of a person or group of persons performing sexual act or any similar activity or of capturing an image of the private area of a person or persons without the latter's consent, under circumstances in which such person/s has/have a reasonable expectation of privacy, or the act of selling, copying, reproducing, broadcasting, sharing, showing or exhibiting the photo or video coverage or recordings of such sexual act or similar activity through VCD/DVD, internet, cellular phones and similar means or device without the written consent of the person/s involved, notwithstanding that consent to record or take photo or video coverage of same was given by such person/s.”(Section 3, Definition of Terms) [Emphasis supplied]

Consent to the coverage and written consent to its further distribution or showing is required in order to stay clear of this law.  But it is another matter whether consent can be a defense to charges of pornography or indecency. This would be covered by the Revised Penal Code, specifically ARTICLE 201 which covers “Immoral doctrines, obscene publications and exhibitions, and indecent shows.”[2]

There is a reasonable expectation of privacy where a person believes “that he/she could disrobe in privacy, without being concerned that an image or a private area of the person was being captured; or circumstances in which a reasonable person would believe that a private area of the person would not be visible to the public, regardless of whether that person is in a public or private place” (Section 3 (f)).  Hence, it doesn’t matter whether you go naked in a motel, in your backyard or even a secluded spot in a public area, you may be “covered” (pun intended) by the law.  The paparazzi will have to behave accordingly.

A violator faces the “penalty of imprisonment of not less than three (3) years but not more than seven (7) years and a fine of not less than One hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) but not more than Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00), or both, at the discretion of the court xxx.”   If the “violator is a juridical person, its license or franchise shall be automatically be deemed revoked and the persons liable shall be the officers thereof including the editor and reporter in the case of print media, and the station manager, editor and broadcaster in the case of a broadcast media. If the offender is a public officer or employee, or a professional, he/she shall be administratively liable. If the offender is an alien, he/she shall be subject to deportation proceedings after serving his/her sentence and payment of fines. (Section 5)”

The only exception is given to peace officers “authorized by a written order of the court, to use the record or any copy thereof as evidence in any civil, criminal investigation or trial of the crime of photo or video voyeurism: Provided, That such written order shall only be issued or granted upon written application and the examination under oath or affirmation of the applicant and the witnesses he/she may produce, and upon showing that there are reasonable grounds to believe that photo or video voyeurism has been committed or is about to be committed, and that the evidence to be obtained is essential to the conviction of any person for, or to the solution or prevention of such, crime  (Section 6).”   Any record, photo or video in violation of the foregoing shall be inadmissible in evidence in any proceeding (Section 7).

The law defines the private area of a person to mean “the naked or undergarment clad genitals, public (sic) area, buttocks or female breast of an individual.” With respect to breasts, it includes “any portion of the female breast.”

It would be interesting to see whether wardrobe malfunctions would be covered by this law.  All the elements would still be present, since there would be video coverage of private parts without consent, albeit accidental, and the broadcast of the same. 

The law speaks of “any portion of the female breast.”  Would a televised shot of a starlet’s cleavage and nothing more be punishable under the law?    It would seem so and this renders the statute vulnerable to Constitutional attack for being vague or too broad. 

The actual application of this law should not take long in coming. There has been one incident where a man was able to record through his cellphone the intimate acts of a couple in a Manila mall’s comfort room.  He thereafter sought ransom in exchange for not posting the video on the net.[3]  And a gym instructor was recently apprehended for “filming upskirt videos in a Quezon City supermarket” using his mobile phone.[4]

It looks like you may stop and look, provided you don’t record anything for posterity or notoriety, as the case may be, if you have no wish to run afoul of this law.  In fine, this Act says that whatever you get to see is for your eyes only, no one else’s.  Yet there is still no escape as you may still be charged with the offense of “unjust vexation”[5] under the Revised Penal Code, the standard complaint against peeping toms.[6]

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[1] All copies thus far on the net use the word “public” when it can be inferred that the correct term is “pubic.”

[2] ARTICLE 201. Immoral doctrines, obscene publications and exhibitions, and indecent shows. — The penalty of prision mayor or a fine ranging from six thousand to twelve thousand pesos, or both such imprisonment and fine, shall be imposed upon:

(1) Those who shall publicly expound or proclaim doctrines openly contrary to public morals;

(2) (a) The authors of obscene literature, published with their knowledge in any form; the editors publishing such literature; and the owners/operators of the establishment selling the same;

(b) Those who, in theaters, fairs, cinematographs or any other place, exhibit indecent or immoral plays, scenes, acts or shows, it being understood that the obscene literature or indecent or immoral plays, scenes, acts or shows, whether live or in film, which are prescribed by virtue hereof, shall include those which (1) glorify criminals or condone crimes; (2) serve no other purpose but to satisfy the market for violence, lust or pornography; (3) offend any race or religion; (4) tend to abet traffic in and use of prohibited drugs; and (5) are contrary to law, public order, morals, and good customs, established policies, lawful orders, decrees and edicts;

(3) Those who shall sell, give away or exhibit films, prints, engravings, sculptures or literature which are offensive to morals. (As amended by Presidential Decree Nos. 960 and 969,

July 24, 1976.)

[3] Javier, Journal Online 2008-09-15 as cited in http://article.wn.com/view/2008/09/15/Sex_scandal_at_mall_CR/

[4]Fitness instructor arrested for capturing upskirt videos, SPOT – Thu, May 5, 2011 http://ph.news.yahoo.com/fitness-instructor-arrested-capturing-upskirt-videos-081100433.html

[5] ARTICLE 287. Light coercions. — Any person who, by means of violence, shall seize anything belonging to his debtor for the purpose of applying the same to the payment of the debt, shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum period and a fine equivalent to the value of the thing, but in no case less than 75 pesos.
Any other coercions or unjust vexations shall be punished by arresto menor or a fine ranging

from 5 to 200 pesos, or both.

[6] Manila clamps down on peeping toms By Sandy Araneta (The Philippine Star) Updated June 05, 2010

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PARK AND PAY: Liability of hotels for guest’s vehicle

By Obiter07

In “DURBAN APARTMENTS CORPORATION doing business under the name and style of City Garden Hotel vs. PIONEER INSURANCE AND SURETY  CORPORATION,” G.R. No. 179419  (January 12, 2011),  the Supreme Court passed upon the liability of hotels for providing valet parking to guests.

This arose after a hotel guest, and Pioneer’s insured, checked into the City Garden hotel in Makati. The hotel’s parking attendant and co-defendant got the keys to the guest’s vehicle and parked it an adjacent lot owned by a third party.  The guest was subsequently awakened so as to be advised that his car had been taken. The guest made the necessary reports and thereafter filed a claim for insurance with Pioneer which paid the same as indemnity for the vehicle’s loss.  Pioneer alleged that the loss was an offshoot of the hotel’s negligence and accordingly filed a claim by means of subrogation, against the hotel and its parking valet. It was established that there was a previous similar incident and yet no “no necessary precautions were taken to prevent its repetition xxx”.  Pioneer argued that the hotel was “was wanting in due diligence in the selection and supervision of its employees particularly its parking valet.”

On a procedural note, Pioneer was allowed to present evidence ex parte in view of the hotel’s failure to file a pre-trial brief and to appear at pre-trial.

The Hotel argued that the insured was not a guest of the hotel but a visitor therein, that its valet did not get his keys but it was the insured who requested him to find a space wherever one was available, that valet parking was provided for convenience of its customers and that it was a special privilege that was given to the insured.  The vehicle was taken without using the key which was even turned over to the owner. Its valet even tried to run after the carnappers to no avail.

 The guest testified that he drove his vehicle in front of the hotel where the parking attendant approached and asked him for his key, and issued a “valet parking customer’s claim stub.”  He then checked in at the hotel with a companion.  At around 1 a.m., he was advised of the carnapping incident.   An adjuster testified that based on his investigation, the hotel would assist guests in parking, and with only 12 parking slots, entered into an agreement with an adjacent bank to use the latter’s space at night. He discovered that a van had been carnapped from the same lot barely a month before.

The lower court ruled in favor of Pioneer and ordered Durban to pay the “sum of P1,163,250.00 with legal interest thereon from July 22, 2003 until the obligation is fully paid and attorney’s fees and litigation expenses amounting to P120,000.00.”   This was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.

The High Court upheld the ruling that the hotel was in “default for failure to appear at the pre-trial conference and to file a pre-trial brief, and thus, correctly allowed respondent to present evidence ex-parte.”  It also affirmed the finding that it was liable for the loss of the vehicle. The procedural aspect will not be dealt with in detail here.

Despite the finding of default, the Supreme Court emphasized that “defendant’s (petitioner’s) preclusion from presenting evidence during trial does not automatically result in a judgment in favor of plaintiff (respondent). The plaintiff must still substantiate the allegations in its complaint.” 

It found that the allegations of Pioneer in the complaint were substantiated, “i.e., a contract of necessary deposit existed between the insured xxx and petitioner. On this score, we find no error in the following disquisition of the appellate court:

[The] records also reveal that upon arrival at the City Garden Hotel, See gave notice to the doorman and parking attendant of the said hotel, x x x Justimbaste, about his Vitara when he entrusted its ignition key to the latter. x x x Justimbaste issued a valet parking customer claim stub to See, parked the Vitara at the Equitable PCI Bank parking area, and placed the ignition key inside a safety key box while See proceeded to the hotel lobby to check in. The Equitable PCI Bank parking area became an annex of City Garden Hotel when the management of the said bank allowed the parking of the vehicles of hotel guests thereat in the evening after banking hours. “

          

Interesting is the finding that the bank’s parking area was deemed an “annex” to the hotel.  A hotel’s use of an adjacent lot appears to subject the same to its control.  

The Court cited Article 1962, in relation to Article 1998, of the Civil Code:

           

“Art. 1962. A deposit is constituted from the moment a person receives a thing belonging to another, with the obligation of safely keeping it and returning the same. If the safekeeping of the thing delivered is not the principal purpose of the contract, there is no deposit but some other contract.

Art. 1998. The deposit of effects made by travelers in hotels or inns shall also be regarded as necessary. The keepers of hotels or inns shall be responsible for them as depositaries, provided that notice was given to them, or to their employees, of the effects brought by the guests and that, on the part of the latter, they take the precautions which said hotel-keepers or their substitutes advised relative to the care and vigilance of their effects.”

The insured deposited the vehicle for safekeeping with the hotel, through its employee.  This employee issued a claim stub to the insured. The contract of deposit was perfected from the delivery of the vehicle, when the keys were handed over to the hotel’s employee, and which he “received with the obligation of safely keeping and returning it.”   

This could conceivably be used as basis for users of mall and other public parking lots to claim indemnity for loss or damage to their vehicles.  It would be interesting to see if the practice of placing disclaimers of liability in the parking stub, as well as in signages, would be upheld by the courts as binding on the users. It does stand to reason that when you are made to park and pay, parking lot providers owe a degree of care to insure your vehicle is kept safe and sound.  And if they fail to adhere to this standard, then they should be sorry they didn’t, as in this case.

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SISTER’S ACT: How an “Outside Catechist” Saves A School From Liability (Aquinas School vs Spouses Inton and Sr. Margarita Yamyamin, OP, G.R. No. 184202, January 26, 2011)

By Siesta-friendly

First of all, we note the long length of time to resolve this issue. The incident subject of this case occurred in 1998.  The trial court issued its decision only in 2006.  The CA decided in 2008 and the SC only this April 2011. The award was for moral damages of P25,000.00, exemplary damages of P25,000.00, and attorney’s fees of P10,000.00 plus the costs of suit.  It took 13 years for complainants to be paid P50,000 in damages.

Anyway, the case as Ponente Justice Abad summarizes, is “about the private school’s liability for the outside catechist’s act of shoving a student and kicking him on the legs when he disobeyed her instruction to remain in his seat and not move around the classroom.”

Based on the Supreme Court’s decision below, an outside catechist is apparently a religion teacher provided by a congregation to teach religion in a school and whose conduct is nobody’s responsibility but himself/herself. 

The Facts

“In 1998 respondent Jose Luis Inton (Jose Luis) was a grade three student at Aquinas School (Aquinas).  Respondent Sister Margarita Yamyamin (Yamyamin), a religion teacher who began teaching at that school only in June of that year, taught Jose Luis’ grade three religion class. 

On July 14, 1998, while Yamyamin was writing on the blackboard, Jose Luis left his assigned seat and went over to a classmate to play a joke of surprising him.  Yamyamin noticed this and sent Jose Luis back to his seat.  After a while, Jose Luis got up again and went over to the same classmate.  This time, unable to tolerate the child’s behavior, Yamyamin approached Jose Luis and kicked him on the legs several times.  She also pulled and shoved his head on the classmate’s seat.  Finally, she told the child to stay where he was on that spot of the room and finish copying the notes on the blackboard while seated on the floor.

As a result of the incident, respondents Jose and Victoria Inton (the Intons) filed an action for damages on behalf of their son Jose Luis against Yamyamin and Aquinas before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City in Civil Case 67427.  The Intons also filed a criminal action against Yamyamin for violation of Republic Act 7610 to which she pleaded guilty and was sentenced accordingly.

With regard to the action for damages, the Intons sought to recover actual, moral, and exemplary damages, as well as attorney’s fees, for the hurt that Jose Luis and his mother Victoria suffered.  The RTC … ruled in Jose Luis’ favor, holding Yamyamin liable to him for moral damages of P25,000.00, exemplary damages of P25,000.00, and attorney’s fees of P10,000.00 plus the costs of suit.

Not satisfied, the Intons elevated the case to the Court of Appeals (CA).  They asked the CA to increase the award of damages and hold Aquinas solidarily liable with Yamyamin.  Finding that an employer-employee relation existed between Aquinas and Yamyamin, the CA found them solidarily liable to Jose Luis.  The CA, however, declined to increase the award of damages.  Jose Luis moved for partial reconsideration but this was denied.  Aquinas, for its part, appealed directly to this Court from the CA decision through a petition for review on certiorari.”

The Ruling

So is the school liable for harm brought by a teacher to a student? Not in this case.  Why not?  Because, believe it or not, Aquinas School – named after St. Thomas Aquinas, the patron saint of Catholic schools of all things – does not have control over its catechists.  So the school says and so the Supreme Court believes.

The SC found that –

“Aquinas had an agreement with a congregation of sisters under which, in order to fulfill its ministry, the congregation would send religion teachers to Aquinas to provide catechesis to its students. The SC favored Aquinas’ insistence that “it was not the school but Yamyamin’s religious congregation that chose her for the task of catechizing the school’s grade three students, much like the way bishops designate the catechists who would teach religion in public schools. Under the circumstances, it was quite evident that Aquinas did not have control over Yamyamin’s teaching methods.  The Intons had not refuted the school directress’ testimony in this regard.  Consequently, it was error for the CA to hold Aquinas solidarily liable with Yamyamin.”

Wow, it’s hard enough to imagine that any school would have an arrangement where they lose control over how their students are educated but who would believe that a private catholic school would even think of losing control over the religious education of their students? 

The SC refers to Sr. Margarita as an “outside cathechist” yet Sr. Margarita is from the same order, O.P. or Ordo Praedicatorum, the Dominican Order. Why then when it comes to religious teaching, is she deemed “outside”?  The only reason she is “outside” is likely because Aquinas is an exclusive school for boys run by Dominican fathers.  Aquinas’ lay teachers would be more “outside” when it comes to catechism as they are outside the Dominican Order. 

Anyway, the SC writes it “applied the “four-fold test” to determine the existence of an employer-employee relationship: the employer (a) selects and engages the employee; (b) pays his wages; (c) has power to dismiss him; and (d) has control over his work.  Of these, the most crucial is the element of control.  Control refers to the right of the employer, whether actually exercised or reserved, to control the work of the employee as well as the means and methods by which he accomplishes the same.”

The SC does not specify, beyond finding the existence of the teaching agreement with the congregation, where the loss of Aquinas’ control over Sr. Margarita Yamyamin’s work begins. 

The SC admits that “[O]f course, Aquinas still had the responsibility of taking steps to ensure that only qualified outside catechists are allowed to teach its young students.”  The SC enumerates the steps Aquinas took to “avoid the occurrence of improper conduct towards the students by their religion teacher”: 

“First, Yamyamin’s transcript of records, certificates, and diplomas showed that she was qualified to teach religion. 

Second, there is no question that Aquinas ascertained that Yamyamin came from a legitimate religious congregation of sisters and that, given her Christian training, the school had reason to assume that she would behave properly towards the students. 

Third, the school gave Yamyamin a copy of the school’s Administrative Faculty Staff Manual that set the standards for handling students.  It also required her to attend a teaching orientation before she was allowed to teach beginning that June of 1998. 

Fourth, the school pre-approved the content of the course she was to teach to ensure that she was really catechizing the students.

 

And fifth, the school had a program for subjecting Yamyamin to classroom evaluation.  Unfortunately, since she was new and it was just the start of the school year, Aquinas did not have sufficient opportunity to observe her methods.  At any rate, it acted promptly to relieve her of her assignment as soon as the school learned of the incident.   It cannot be said that Aquinas was guilty of outright neglect.”

But why does the SC limit its findings on the school’s responsibility only to the above 5 steps to justify absolving Aquinas of neglect?  In any case, aren’t they applicable as regards any teacher “outside” or not?

What now prevents a school from having an agreement with other congregations/groups under which the latter would provide teachers to teach other school subjects so that the school is absolved from any responsibility for any of said teachers’ misconduct?

It seems parents must now check what kind of teaching arrangements their children’s schools have.  As these arrangements may matter when a school’s liability is raised once a teacher does wrong to their children.  Obviously, a Catholic school is not beyond doing a Pontius Pilate by washing its hands of liability for a sister’s act.

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CONTACT CONTRACT? (A spouse's refusal to have sexual relations is not a ground for annulment)

By Obiter07

A husband had reason to go up to the Supreme Court to try and have his marriage annulled on the ground of his wife’s refusal to have sexual intercourse. Sadly for him, the Court ruled,that such refusal is not tantamount to psychological incapacity (see Baccay vs. Baccay, et al., G.R. No. 173138 December 1, 2010).

The petitioner husband and respondent wife were schoolmates. Petitioner courted the respondent and it was only after “years of continuous pursuit” that they became sweethearts. At the outset, petitioner observed that respondent was aloof and distant to his relatives despite his efforts to bring them closer. He later on broke up with her as he found another girl.  Respondent refused the break up and offered to remain friends, despite the other relationship. But they still managed to have “several romantic moments” which petitioner treated casually until sometime in 1998 when respondent informed him that she was pregnant. Petitioner “grudgingly” married respondent, partly at the prompting of his mother.

When they set out to live at petitioner family’s house, respondent still remained aloof from the family, coming and going as she pleased and not contributing to the upkeep of the household. And she now refused to have any sexual contact. Petitioner did not observe any pregnancy symptoms, which observation was shared by respondent’s officemates. Later on, respondent failed to go home for one day and thereafter announced that she had a miscarriage.

Petitioner confronted her about this which intensified into a quarrel. When petitioner’s mother sought to intervene, respondent cursed here.  They were asked to leave the house.  Respondent’s parents then picked her up and never came back despite petitioner’s efforts.  After less than two years of marriage, petitioner filed “a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage.  Respondent did not participate in the proceedings. The RTC ruled in his favor declaring the marriage null and void. On appeal by the Office of the Solicitor General, the decision of the RTC was reversed based on the finding that the respondent’s failure “to establish that Maribel’s supposed Narcissistic Personality Disorder was the psychological incapacity contemplated by law and that it was permanent and incurable. xxx “

Petitioner went to the Supreme Court which found that the issue “to be resolved is whether the marriage between the parties is null and void under Article 36 of the Family Code.”

ART. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.

Petitioner argues that respondent’s “refusal to procreate” amounts to psychological incapacity. He states that their last sexual contact was before the marriage when respondent was drunk.  And that “if a spouse senselessly and constantly refuses to perform his or her marital obligations, Catholic marriage tribunals attribute the causes to psychological incapacity rather than to stubborn refusal.” Their pre-marital relations which petitioner considers as “casual” sex should be distinguished from “making love for procreation and consummation of the marriage for the start of family life.”  Respondent just railroaded him into marriage.  

Petitioner submits “other indicia” of psychological incapacity as respondent displayed traits of someone suffering from Narcissistic Personality Disorder before and during the marriage.  Respondent would not mingle with his family and was rude to his mother.  She was “arrogant and haughty.” She was “interpersonally exploitative” when she misrepresented her pregnancy.  After marriage, she never showed respect and love to petitioner and his family.  He pointed out that the “psychological incapacity was proven to be permanent and incurable with the root cause existing before the marriage. The psychologist testified that persons suffering from Narcissistic Personality Disorder were unmotivated to participate in therapy session and would reject any form of psychological help rendering their condition long lasting if not incurable.  Such persons would not admit that their behavioral manifestations connote pathology or abnormality.  The psychologist added that Maribel’s psychological incapacity was deeply rooted within her adaptive system since early childhood and manifested during adult life.”

The Supreme Court was unconvinced.

In Santos v. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 112019, January 4, 1995) the Court held “that the phrase “psychological incapacity” is not meant to comprehend all possible cases of psychoses.  It refers to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly noncognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and support.  The intendment of the law has been to confine it to the most serious of cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage.”

In Republic of the Phils. v. Court of Appeals (335 Phil. 664, 676-678 (1997), the Court stated the guidelines in resolving petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage amongwhich is that the “burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. xxx” Moreover, the “incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable.”

In this case, the “totality of evidence” is not sufficient to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity.  The evidence merely established refusal to have sexual intercourse after marriage and that she left after the quarrel about the alleged miscarriage.  There was no proof of the “root cause of the alleged psychological incapacity and establish the requirements of gravity, juridical antecedence, and incurability.” The report of the psychologist ““did not establish how the personality disorder incapacitated” the respondent “from validly assuming the essential obligations of the marriage.” She even testified that respondent “was capable of entering into a marriage except that it would be difficult for her to sustain one.

“Mere difficulty, it must be stressed, is not the incapacity contemplated by law. The Court emphasizes that the burden falls upon petitioner, not just to prove that private respondent suffers from a psychological disorder, but also that such psychological disorder renders her “truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage.”  Psychological incapacity must be more than just a “difficulty,” a “refusal,” or a “neglect” in the performance of some marital obligations.  An unsatisfactory marriage is not a null and void marriage.” 

As the Court held in in Marcos v. Marcos (397 Phil. 840, 851 (2000)): “Article 36 of the Family Code, we stress, is not to be confused with a divorce law that cuts the marital bond at the time the causes therefor manifest themselves.  It refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a party even before the celebration of the marriage. It is a malady so grave and so permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume. x x x.”

It appears that as far as the Court is concerned that marriage is not just a contact contract.  Now it would take more than a wife saying no to a husband’s advances before it can be annulled.  Where intimacy once defined the term ‘marriage’, the Supreme Court now holds mere capacity to contract as sufficient definition. 

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