Pursuant to the
1987 Constitution and Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, an accused is not entitled
to bail in capital offenses - or where the charges would merit the penalty of
reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment - until the court holds hearings
to determine if the evidence of guilt is strong. In this case, bail was granted even though 1) the
case involved plunder where the convicted principal shall be punished by life
imprisonment; 2) there was no evidentiary hearing (to determine if the evidence
of guilt is strong); 3) the granting of bail was based on new grounds: ill
health, social standing and the previous favorable conduct of the accused; and
4) the new grounds were not even alleged by the accused.
In Enrile vs.
Sandiganbayan, et al. (G.R. No. 213847, August 18, 2015), the Court’s opening statements
are telling of its final verdict: “[t]he decision whether to detain or release an accused before
and during trial is ultimately an incident of the judicial power to hear and
determine his criminal case.”
However, the “strength of the
Prosecution’s case, albeit a good measure of the accused’s propensity for
flight or for causing harm to the public, is subsidiary to the primary
objective of bail, which is to ensure that the accused appears at trial.”
Senator Enrile was charged, with
several others, of the crime of plunder before the Sandiganbayan with respect
to the alleged “diversion and misuse of appropriations under the Priority
Development Assistance Fund (PDAF).” When
a warrant of arrest was issued against him, Senator Enrile surrendered himself
to the Sandiganbayan and was later confined at the PNP hospital. He then filed
the Motion to Fix Bail, arguing that bail should be granted “because: (a) the
Prosecution had not yet established that the evidence of his guilt was strong;
(b) although he was charged with plunder, the penalty as to him would only
be reclusion temporal, not reclusion perpetua; and (c)
he was not a flight risk, and his age and physical condition must further be
seriously considered.” This was denied by Sandiganbayan. His motion for reconsideration of this
resolution was likewise denied. He then
filed a petition for certiorari before the Supreme Court.
In the Supreme Court, he further argued
that, if convicted, he would not face the penalty of reclusion perpetua
“considering the presence of two mitigating circumstances – his age and his
voluntary surrender.” There is also no “proof showing that his guilt for the
crime of plunder is strong; and that he should not be considered a flight risk
taking into account that he is already over the age of 90, his medical
condition, and his social standing.”
The Court stated that it could
not consider his argument that the “two mitigating circumstances that should be
appreciated in his favor, namely: that he was already over 70 years at the time
of the alleged commission of the offense, and that he voluntarily surrendered”
would entitle him to bail as this would lower the penalty from reclusion
perpetua. This was because, “the determination, being primarily
factual in context, is ideally to be made by the trial court.”
The Court instead granted bail even
in the absence of a hearing to determine guilt “guided by the earlier mentioned
principal purpose of bail, which is to guarantee the appearance of the accused
at the trial, or whenever so required by the court.” It went on to cite
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights to:
“x x x uphold the fundamental
human rights as well as value the worth and dignity of every person. This
commitment is enshrined in Section II, Article II of our Constitution which
provides: “The State values the dignity of every human person and guarantees
full respect for human rights.”
The Court determined that “[t]he
Philippines, therefore, has the responsibility of protecting and promoting the
right of every person to liberty and due process, ensuring that those detained
or arrested can participate in the proceedings before a court, to enable it to
decide without delay on the legality of the detention and order their release
if justified. In other words, the Philippine authorities are under obligation
to make available to every person under detention such remedies which safeguard
their fundamental right to liberty. These remedies include the right to be
admitted to bail.” [Emphasis supplied]
The Court gave weight to “his
social and political standing and his having immediately surrendered to the
authorities upon his being charged in court indicate that the risk of his
flight or escape from this jurisdiction is highly unlikely. His personal
disposition from the onset of his indictment for plunder, formal or otherwise,
has demonstrated his utter respect for the legal processes of this country. We
also do not ignore that at an earlier time many years ago when he had been
charged with rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated murder, he already
evinced a similar personal disposition of respect for the legal processes, and
was granted bail during the pendency of his trial because he was not seen as a
flight risk. With his solid reputation in both his public and his private
lives, his long years of public service, and history’s judgment of him being at
stake, he should be granted bail.”
Also the “currently fragile state of Enrile’s health presents another compelling justification for his admission to bail xxx.” His various ailments were considered by the Court, from hypertension to COPD which, singly or collectively, could pose significant risks to the life of Enrile xxx.” Even the OIC of the PNP General Hospital where he was confined, did not recommend that this confinement continue “because of the limitations in the medical support at that hospital.”
The Court further held that bail
“for the provisional liberty of the accused, regardless of the crime
charged, should be allowed independently of the merits of the charge,
provided his continued incarceration is clearly shown to be injurious to his
health or to endanger his life. Indeed, denying him bail despite imperiling his
health and life would not serve the true objective of preventive incarceration
during the trial.
Citing Dela Rama v. The
People’s Court: “x x x [U]nless allowance of bail is forbidden by law
in the particular case, the illness of the prisoner, independently of the
merits of the case, is a circumstance, and the humanity of the law makes it a
consideration which should, regardless of the charge and the stage of the
proceeding, influence the court to exercise its discretion to admit the
prisoner to bail; x x x”
The Court observed that “that granting provisional liberty to Enrile will then enable him to have his medical condition be properly addressed and better attended to by competent physicians in the hospitals of his choice. This will not only aid in his adequate preparation of his defense but, more importantly, will guarantee his appearance in court for the trial.”
He should not be made to wait “for the trial to finish before a meaningful consideration of the application for bail can be had is to defeat the objective of bail, which is to entitle the accused to provisional liberty pending the trial. There may be circumstances decisive of the issue of bail – whose existence is either admitted by the Prosecution, or is properly the subject of judicial notice – that the courts can already consider in resolving the application for bail without awaiting the trial to finish.” The Court stated that it was balancing “the scales of justice by protecting the interest of the People through ensuring his personal appearance at the trial, and at the same time realizing for him the guarantees of due process as well as to be presumed innocent until proven guilty.”
It found that the Sandiganbayan “arbitrarily
ignored the objective of bail to ensure the appearance of the accused during
the trial; and unwarrantedly disregarded the clear showing of the fragile
health and advanced age of Enrile.” The Court ordered his release upon the
posting of a cash bond of P1,000,000.00.
Since under the Constitution and the Rules of Court,
humanitarian considerations are not grounds for the grant of bail, we remain
curious as to the Court’s future decisions once similar humanitarian petitions
for bail are filed.
