Misgivings
about the SC doctrine of condonation (by re-election), a ruling exemplified in Aguinaldo vs Santos (G.R. No. 94115,
August 21, 1992)
,
have arisen again thanks to Makati City Mayor Junjun Binay’s argument that the
Ombudsman’s preventive suspension order against him was wrong because his
alleged acts of misconduct occurred in his previous term and was thus condoned
once he was re-elected.
The Condonation doctrine
By
the way, the Philippine cases on which Aguinaldo
vs Santos is based - Pascual v.
Provincial Board of Nueva Ecija (L-11959, October 31, 1959) and Lizares v. Hechanova, et al., (G.R. No.
L-22059, May 17, 1966) - were decided
before the 1987 Constitution so we chose not to discuss these cases as they
were held long before the present Constitution and its stronger language on a public
official’s accountability became effective.
There
have been other condonation cases post-1987 that have been based on the Pascual and Lizares rulings, but we are choosing Aguinaldo vs Santos as this ruling is the first one held post-1987
and is oft-cited, plus the decisions are all basically the same anyway, i.e., re-election means the condonation
of an administrative offense done by the re-elected official during his
previous term.
Aguinaldo vs Santos
In
March 19, 1990, in an administrative case against Cagayan Governor Rodolfo E.
Aguinaldo, the Secretary of Local Government found the governor guilty of disloyalty
to the Republic - for involvement in the failed December 1989 coup d'etat - and ordered his dismissal.
Mr.
Aguinaldo went to the Supreme Court and filed a petition for certiorari and
prohibition with preliminary mandatory injunction and/or restraining order,
questioning the decision of the Secretary of Local Government.
While
the SC case was pending, Mr. Aguinaldo filed his certificate of candidacy for
the May 11, 1992 elections to run again for the governorship. On May 9, 1992, petitions for
disqualification were filed against him with the COMELEC, and the COMELEC
ordered his disqualification. In May
14, 1992, the SC issued a TRO against the COMELEC to cease and desist from
enforcing its May 9, 1992 resolution pending the outcome of the SC
disqualification case. The TRO, in
effect, allowed the canvassing of the votes and returns in Cagayan. The SC also ordered COMELEC not to proclaim a
winner until the SC’s decision. Later,
the SC annulled COMELEC’s May 9, 1992 resolution because the disqualification
case was still pending before the SC.
Eventually, Mr. Aguinaldo won by a landslide which led to his being
proclaimed governor.
The
SC then held that Mr. Aguinaldo’s “re-election to the position of Governor of
Cagayan has rendered the administration case pending before Us moot and
academic.” (So convenient, no?)
In
ruling that –
“a public official can not be removed for
administrative misconduct committed during a prior term, since his re-election
to office operates as a condonation of the officer's previous misconduct to the
extent of cutting off the right to remove him therefore.”
the
SC cited the following US and Philippine rulings, to wit:
“The underlying theory is that each term is
separate from other terms, and that the reelection to office operates as a
condonation of the officer's misconduct to the extent of cutting off the right
to remove him therefor. (43 Am. Jur. p. 45, citing Atty. Gen. v. Kasty, 184
Ala. 121, 63 Sec. 599, 50 L.R.A. [NS] 553). As held in Comant v. Bregan [ 1887]
6 N.Y.S.R. 332, cited in 17 A.L.R. 63 Sec. 559, 50 [NE] 553.”
“The Court should ever remove a public officer for
acts done prior to his present term of office. To do otherwise would be to
deprive the people of their right to elect their officers. When a people have
elected a man to office, it must be assumed that they did this with knowledge
of his life and character, and that they disregarded or forgave his fault or
misconduct, if he had been guilty of any. It is not for the court, by reason of
such fault or misconduct, to practically overrule the will of the people.
(Lizares v. Hechanova, et al., 17 SCRA 58, 59-60 [1966]) (See also Oliveros v.
Villaluz, 57 SCRA 163 [1974])”
It
is peculiar that the post-1987 cases on condonation by re-election do not
involve a discussion of the provisions of the 1987 Constitution on the accountability of public officers and the
apparent conflict between the doctrine and the 1987 Constitution.
The Condonation doctrine vs the 1987
Constitution
Clearly,
the condonation doctrine does not uphold the following Constitutional
directives on the public accountability of public officials.
Public
Accountability
“Public office is a public trust. Public officers
and employees must, at all times, be accountable to the people, serve them with
utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency; act with patriotism
and justice, and lead modest lives.”
“The State shall maintain honesty and integrity in
the public service and take positive and effective measures against graft and
corruption.”
Powers
of the Ombudsman
In
addition, the condonation doctrine hampers the Ombudsman from exercising
his/her constitutionally-mandated powers to make public officers accountable to
the people.
“The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the
following powers, functions, and duties:
(1) Investigate on its own, or on complaint by any
person, any act or omission of any public official, employee, office or agency,
when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper, or
inefficient.
(2) Direct, upon complaint or at its own instance,
any public official or employee of the Government, or any subdivision, agency
or instrumentality thereof, as well as of any government-owned or controlled
corporation with original charter, to perform and expedite any act or duty
required by law, or to stop, prevent, and correct any abuse or impropriety in
the performance of duties.
(3) Direct the officer concerned to take
appropriate action against a public official or employee at fault, and
recommend his removal, suspension, demotion, fine, censure, or prosecution, and
ensure compliance therewith.
(4) Direct the officer concerned, in any
appropriate case, and subject to such limitations as may be provided by law, to
furnish it with copies of documents relating to contracts or transactions
entered into by his office involving the disbursement or use of public funds or
properties, and report any irregularity to the Commission on Audit for
appropriate action.
(5) Request any government agency for assistance
and information necessary in the discharge of its responsibilities, and to
examine, if necessary, pertinent records and documents.
(6) Publicize matters covered by its investigation
when circumstances so warrant and with due prudence.
(7) Determine the causes of inefficiency, red tape,
mismanagement, fraud, and corruption in the Government and make recommendations
for their elimination and the observance of high standards of ethics and
efficiency.
(8) Promulgate its rules of procedure and exercise
such other powers or perform such functions or duties as may be provided by
law.”
The Condonation doctrine vs the Local
Government Code
While
we’re at it, we might as well add that the condonation doctrine prevents the
removal of an elective official as provided in the Local Government Code’s
provisions on Disciplinary Actions.
“Grounds for Disciplinary Actions. – An elective
local official may be disciplined, suspended, or removed from office on any of
the following grounds:
(a)
Disloyalty to
the Republic of the Philippines;
(b)
Culpable violation
of the Constitution;
(c)
Dishonesty,
oppression, misconduct in office, gross negligence, or dereliction of duty;
(d)
Commission of
any offense involving moral turpitude or an offense punishable by at least
prision mayor;
(e)
Abuse of
authority;
(f)
Unauthorized absence
for fifteen (15) consecutive working days, except in the case of members of the
sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod, sangguniang bayan, and
sangguniang barangay;
(g)
Application
for, or acquisition of, foreign citizenship or residence or the status of an
immigrant of another country; and
(h)
Such other
grounds as may be provided in this Code and other laws.
An elective local official may be removed from
office on the grounds enumerated above by order of the proper court.”
The
condonation doctrine is indefensible without Pascual vs. Provincial Board of Nueva Ecija. The doctrine has no constitutional nor
statutory basis. In fact, it runs
counter to significant constitutional and statutory provisions meant to protect
the public from erring public officials.
Remember
–
·
The
Constitution said “public officers and employees must, at all times, be
accountable to the people” and NOT “public officers and employees must, only during their current term of office,
be accountable to the people”.
·
The Constitution
said “public officers and employees must, at all times, be accountable to the
people” and NOT “public officers and employees must, at all times, be
accountable only to the people who voted
for them”.
It’s
about time the Supreme Court gets with the program long set by the Constitution
and by law. If a public official violates his oath of office, then he should be
properly punished. At best, allow only
the President, under his/her Constitutionally-granted pardon powers to condone
the offense. No one else has been
granted, by Constitution or statute, the power to pardon.
