Monday, September 27, 2010

Where’s the Truth Commission on Human Rights Abuses?

By Siesta-friendly

From Argentina to the U.S., truth commissions have been established to reveal human rights violations and violators.  The Philippines is up there in world rankings relating to human rights abuses.  We rank 3rd - after Iraq and Somalia – in the CPJ’s (Committee to Protect Journalists) 2010 Global Impunity Index (of countries “where journalists are slain and killers go free”).[1]

In 2009, the ICRC (International Committee of the Red Cross) included the Philippines in its report on 8 of “the most troubled places in the world … which are either experiencing situations of armed conflict or armed violence or suffering their aftermath”.[2]  We are in the list together with Afghanistan, Colombia, Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Georgia, Haiti, Lebanon and Liberia.

In 2007, the UN was already so concerned that they sent Special Rapporteur, Philip Alston, “prompted by reports of a large number of extrajudicial killings, especially of leftist activists and journalists, over the past six years or so.”[3] 

Also in 2007, the International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH), sent a fact-finding mission because of [“i]ncreasing allegations that the Filipino government’s fight against terrorism causes specific human rights violations … The preliminary conclusions of the mission are very worrying: it appears that torture, enforced disappearances and extrajudicial killings are common practice in the Philippines …”[4] 

Local human rights group Karapatan (Alliance for the Advancement of People’s Rights) reports that from 2001-2009 (the Gloria Arroyo regime) there have been 1,188 extrajudicial killings, 208 enforced disappearances, 1,963 illegal arrests (excluding mass arrests) and 288 political prisoners.[5]

Yet despite our notorious human rights record and culture of impunity, the new Aquino government chooses instead to set up a truth commission to uncover corruption. To be fair, our culture of corruption deserves serious focus as well.  But it is telling of our government’s priorities when President Aquino’s 1st State of the Nation Address (last July) enumerated allegations of corruption and no hint of human rights abuses, and his first Executive Order is the establishment of the Truth Commission on corruption with hardly any pronouncement, to date, on the government’s efforts regarding extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances.

Why are human rights abuses not a top priority?

The need to investigate human rights abuses

On July 12, 2010, a hopeful Human Rights Watch (HRW) wrote President Aquino its hopes, concerns and recommendations.[6]  Its first recommendation?  To investigate police and military personnel implicated in killings -

Human Rights Watch has found that police investigators in alleged extrajudicial killing cases often adopt a posture of irresponsible passivity, doing nothing themselves to investigate these crimes and placing the onus entirely on victims' families, many of whom have no idea who murdered their loved one. Police investigators routinely ignore anonymous leads, despite the fear of retaliation that compels witnesses to resort to anonymity.

Instead, investigators have told Human Rights Watch that they will not launch an investigation until someone is brave enough to risk his or her life by delivering a signed statement. Even when victims have allegedly been abducted by security forces, the police typically conduct only a perfunctory search. The Arroyo government made much of the human rights training that is given to the police but the lessons learned in the classroom are quickly unlearned when police officers see that no one is held accountable for such lackluster investigations of human rights abuses.

In your first 60 days in office, you should:

·         Order the Criminal Investigation and Detection Group (CIDG) and the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) to investigate police and military personal, particularly at the command level, who have been implicated in killings and enforced disappearances.

·         Issue an executive order directing police and NBI investigators to vigorously pursue crimes allegedly committed by government officials and police officers or themselves be subject to disciplinary measures for insubordination or a criminal investigation for obstruction of justice or graft and corruption.

·         Publicly order the chief of the Philippine National Police to open hotlines or comparable lines of communication to receive anonymous information on extrajudicial killings and other human rights abuses.

To round up the HRW’s 6 recommendations, here are the remaining 5: 1) Take immediate steps to protect the witnesses to human rights abuses and their families; 2) Pass a law to criminalize and prevent enforced disappearances; 3) Abolish militia forces; 4) Institute tougher controls on local government procurement of weapons; 5) Dismantle "death squads" and investigate government involvement.[7] 

Of course, the HRW is hardly alone.  The UN Special Rapporteur and the FIDH fact-mission recommended effective investigations as well, among other things.   In its report on The State of Human Rights in the Philippines in 2009, the Asian Human Rights Commission (AHRC) discussed “[t]he failure to investigate hundreds of political killings attributable to the State” as a topic of concern.[8] Below is a brief summary of their findings.

Government actions

Task Force Usig

In the AHRC report are listed the Arroyo government’s attempts to address extrajudicial killings.  (Unfortunately, only extrajudicial killings have largely been focused on, if at all. There has been no special agency to handle illegal detention or enforced disappearance cases.) 

As reported by the AHRC, Task Force Usig was created in 2006 under the Philippine National Police “to resolve at least 'ten cases of alleged extra-judicial killings within ten weeks'. Over three years later, there is no evidence to suggest that the task force has been able to meet the target.”  The report also notes that “[e]ven if the task force had been able to meet its target of resolving one case a week, in mid-2006 there were already some 700 allegations of political killings and this would have taken the task force 14 years to complete the job.”[9]

Task Force 211

It seemed that Task Force Usig was deemed insufficient because shortly after its creation or in 2007, Task Force 211 under the DOJ (Department of Justice) was created.  As of February 2010, Task Force 211 has only handled 265 cases of extrajudicial killings (versus 1,188 reported by Karapatan), more than half of which are either already archived, cold or dismissed[10] -

CASE CLASSIFICATION
TOTAL
I. Archived/ Accused at
Large
70
II. Cold Cases
50
III. Dismissed   Cases 
65
IV. On Trial
35
V. Under Police Investigation
13
VI. Under Preliminary Investigation
14
VII. Terminated (Trial on the Merits)
18
TOTAL
265

Special Courts

Also in 2007, the Supreme Court (SC) issued Administrative Order No. 25-2007 (a copy of which we could not find so we are relying on Court of Appeals Associate Justice Lucas P. Bersamin’s “Available Judicial Remedies In Cases Of Extrajudicial Killings And Enforced Disappearances”)[11] for the SC AO’s contents.  The SC designated “about 100 Regional Trial Courts throughout the country as special courts to hear, try and decide cases involving killings of political activists and members of the media.  Such cases are given priority in the trial calendars of the special courts and shall undergo continuous trial (to be terminated within 60 days from the commencement of the hearing) and determined within 30 days from the time the cases are submitted for decision, unless a shorter period is provided by the law or otherwise directed by the Supreme Court. To expedite the proceedings, no postponement or continuance shall be allowed except for clearly meritorious cases.”[12]

AHRC’s report notes that SC has guidelines to the special courts "to include the status of the extra-judicial cases in their monthly report of cases." “Despite the SC's guidelines, however, there are no known monthly status reports available. It is not known whether any sanctions were imposed on judges and court staff as a result.”[13]

To put a long story short, not only do these government efforts fall short of substantially addressing human rights abuses but their existence only emphasize the failure of government avenues normally used for the redress of such abuses.

We need the whole truth and nothing but the truth on all forms of abuses before we can even think of starting afresh.  And so we go back to our initial question: Where’s the truth commission on human rights abuses?
 



[2]  Summary report: afghanistan, colombia, democratic republic of the congo, georgia, haiti, lebanon, liberia and the philippines. (2009, June). Retrieved from http://www.icrc.org/Web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/htmlall/views-from-field-report-240609/$File/Our%20World%20-%20Views%20From%20Countries%20-%20Summary%20Report%20Part1-BKMRK.pdf
[3]  Alston, P. (2007, March 27). U.N. General Assembly, Human Rights Council, Fourth Session Agenda Item 2, Implementation of general assembly resolution 60/251 of 15 march 2006 entitled “human rights council”. Preliminary note on the visit of the special rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, philip alston, to the philippines (12-21 february 2007), (A/HRC/4/20/ADD.3). Retrieved from http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G07/120/95/PDF/G0712095.pdf?OpenElement
[4]  International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH) and Philippine Alliance of Human Rights Advocates (PAHRA) Submission for the first session of the Universal Periodic Review 7-18 April 2008 Republic of the Philippines. (2008, April 7-18). Retrieved from http://lib.ohchr.org/HRBodies/UPR/Documents/Session1/PH/FIDH_PHL_UPR_S1_2008_InternationalFederationforHumanRights_etal_uprsubmission.pdf
[5]  2009 year-end report on the human rights situation in the philippines. (2009, December 12). Retrieved from http://www.karapatan.org/2009-HR-Report
[6] Roth, K. (2010, July 12). Letter to president aquino regarding extrajudicial killings in the philippines. Retrieved from http://www.hrw.org/node/91567
[7]  Philippines: ending killings should top aquino’s agenda. (2010, July 12). Retrieved from http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2010/07/12/philippines-ending-killings-should-top-aquino-s-agenda
[8]  The state of Human rights in the philippines in 2009. (2009). Retrieved from http://material.ahrchk.net/hrreport/2009/AHRC-SPR-007-2009-Philippines-HRReport2009.pdf
[9]  Ibid, p.8.
[10]  Total number of cases. (2010, February 23). Retrieved from http://www.taskforce211.com.ph/bk_sub/bk_sub/ejk/ejk_total_sub.html
[11]  Bersamin, L. (n.d.). Available judicial remedies in cases of extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances. Retrieved from http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/publications/summit/Summit%20Papers/Bersamin%20-%20Extrajudicial%20Killings%20Summit.pdf
[12]  Ibid, p.3
[13]   The state of Human rights in the philippines in 2009, supra; p.10.


NEWER POST       |       PREVIOUS POST

Thursday, September 2, 2010

COMMANDING OR MONITORING? (Which of President Aquino’s statements is correct on his exact role during the hostage crisis?)

By Siesta-friendly

We find some contradictory statements by President Aquino, in the aftermath of the Quirino Grandstand hostage crisis, quite disturbing as they show to us 1) a possible amount of lying to the public and even to another head of government no less, 2) a degree of deflecting government liability despite complete video coverage of the entire hostage situation and the government’s visible inadequate responses, and 3) an over-all lack of integrity on a nation’s leader.

There are many reasons to resent President Aquino’s decisions in relation to the hostage crisis: a) the lack of noticeable sadness and seriousness (with frequent smiling while at times seemingly arrogant or casual with arms folded across his chest) shortly after the deaths of innocent lives as seen during his press conference a few hours after the crisis – the conference seemed more akin to an informal discussion than a sad moment of reflection immediately following the loss of 8 innocent lives; b) a lack of concern for the hostages having failed to ever visit them the few days they remained in the country while being able to inspect the crime scene the day after the crisis (while not forgetting to carry over the smiles he had during the previous night’s presscon); c) the refusal to direct even a hint of blame for the deaths on the government’s decision to be patient with the hostage-taker despite several opportunities to disable him; d) frequent finger-pointing at the media as major contributor to the deaths.  We could go on and on.

But we take issue now on the president’s statements regarding his exact role during the crisis.

In his first press conference a few hours after the hostage crisis, President Aquino replied to the question why it took him so long “to come out and face the nation” as follows:

“… the ground commander has to be given confidence. He is the person who is there at the site, who will have to make the snap decisions if necessary and it does not help him to have somebody looking over his shoulder and micro-managing everything that he has to do.

So consciously, from the morning since we were informed of this incident, we were asking to be kept apprised of the developments, but consciously, it had to [unintelligible]. We delegated the authority to the rightful persons who are tasked to carry out the functions of the state given the situations.”[1] [emphasis supplied]

In the same presscon, when asked if he had plans to call Hong Kong Chief Executive Donald Tsang, Aquino mentioned:

“… mula kaninang umaga hinihingi kong ma-update sa lahat ng developments.  Ngayong gabi po, siniusubukan kong maunawaan yung kabuoan nung ng nangyari …” [since this morning, I had asked to be updated of all developments.  Tonight, I am trying to understand the entirety of what happened][2]

Nowhere in the above statements is there any indication that Aquino did more than inquire about what was going on.  And definitely, no indication that he was engrossed in commanding or even supervising the government’s actions to what were unfolding at the Quirino Grandstand.  Aquino’s statements above jibe with his Presidential Communications Secretary Ricky Carandang’s statements that Aquino was [just] monitoring the hostage situation and was [only] being updated of the events.[3] 

Both Aquino and Carandang’s statements are in harmony with the subsequent senate investigation last week which found that Manila Mayor Alfredo Lim was head of the local crisis committee and thus the civilian in-charge of the hostage situation.[4]

YET, in explaining to Mr. Tsang why he was unable to return the latter’s call (the South China Morning Post reports Tsang’s office made 2 calls, the 1st at 4 p.m. and the 2nd at 8 p.m.), Aquino says, in the words of Donald Tsang:

After his telephone conversation with the president on Tuesday, Tsang said in a video posted on the internet: "The first thing he told me was that he was sorry for not having called me back [on Monday] because he was then busy commanding the operation."[5] [emphasis supplied]

Another version of possibly the same video address states Donald Tsang’s words as follows:

“President Aquino rang me up and he apologized for the event. He felt particularly sorrowful for what had happened and he also apologized that he could not return my call because he was totally engaged in supervising the operation," he said in a video address on Friday. [emphasis supplied]

That Aquino deemed himself too busy to call or even return the call of a head of government at a time of national importance to the latter and his people is distressing.  It shows disrespect and disregard. 

But how then do we assess the apparent contradictory statements of the president: his assertions that imply he did no more than be updated of the developments relating to the hostage situation against his claims that he was too busy to even return the calls of another head of government worried about the latter’s fellow citizens? 

It doesn’t end there - Aquino has been reported to have said he did not know Tsang called.[6]

So, Aquino tells Tsang he was too busy to return his call at the same time admitting that he did not know Tsang called. Which is which?

All these statements cannot be taken lightly especially because of their national significance as to his role during the hostage crisis as well as the international implication as to the truth of his unavailability to be reached by Hong Kong’s head of government and the over-all significance of the suspicion of untruthfulness on the part of our nation’s leader.

It’s barely 2 months after his inauguration and President Aquino has already failed a leadership test.  Would he also fail a lie detector test?

Dare to be true. Nothing can need a lie:
a fault which needs it most, grows two thereby.
George Herbert


[1]  (1/3) manila hostage crisis - 1st live press conference noynoy aquino (full coverage) 08-24-2010 . (2010). [Web]. Retrieved from http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YZZNPASyFn0
[2]  (2/3) manila hostage crisis - 1st live press conference noynoy aquino (full coverage) 08-24-2010 . (2010). [Web]. Retrieved from http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=f69nmKxJW1g&feature=related
[3]  Adriatico , F. (2010, August 25). Retr ieved from http://www.pbs.gov.ph/new/site/?section=news&category=national&article_id=69
[4]  Mendez, C. (2010, August 27). 'Lim headed hostage crisis committee' . Retrieved from http://www.philstar.com/Article.aspx?articleId=606521&publicationSubCategoryId=63
[5]  Robles , R, & Fung, F. (2010, August 26). Tsang's phone calls stopped with aquino's aides. Retrieved from http://www.scmp.com/portal/site/SCMP/menuitem.2af62ecb329d3d7733492d9253a0a0a0/?vgnextoid=30c9ade342aaa210VgnVCM100000360a0a0aRCRD&ss=Hong+Kong&s=News
[6]  Tordesillas, E. (2010, August 25). Aquino calls up donald tsang. Retrieved from http://verafiles.org/main/focus/making-up-to-hongkong/

NEWER POST       |       PREVIOUS POST